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The purpose of this thesis is to study and evaluate the public attitude and reactions to 
reportages of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) related corporate 
misbehavior as they externalize in changes in the investors‟ investing behavior. More 
specifically, the stock market reactions to negative ESG-news are measured and analyzed in 
order to answer how negative ESG-news affect companies‟ stock returns in the short- and 
long-run, and whether the market reaction has changed over time. 
DATA 
The empirical study is based on a dataset of 123 negative ESG-news concerning companies 
that are publicly listed in Europe. The news articles were published between 1
st
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1998 and 31
st
 of December 2007 mainly in The Financial Times. The topics of the news were 
related to irresponsible behavior of companies in regard to people, environment, or laws and 
regulations. The market reaction to the news was measured as abnormal stock returns, and 
thus time series of firm specific daily returns were used on this study. 
RESULTS 
The main findings of this research show a significantly negative market reaction in stock 
returns in the short-term (±5 days) and a significantly positive in the long-term (12, 24, and 36 
months). Thus, the empirical results indicate that investors overreact to the news. The results 
also suggest that the short-term negative reaction has intensified over the years and the long-
term buy-and-hold abnormal returns have decreased. On average, the initial market reaction 
was -2.3% and took place four days before the news was published in a newspaper. The 11-
day cumulative abnormal returns were -3.1% for the total sample. Significant buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns were observed during the three post-event years (36 month BHAR +25%), 
however, significant and positive abnormal returns were not persistently present in each month. 
The news category of environmental, social or corporate governance influenced significantly 
the extent and direction of the market reaction 
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uutisointeihin negatiivisista ESG- (Environmental, Social, Governance) tapauksista niiden 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Academic and practical motivation 
Concerns over whether or not our current market economy is able to provide sustainable long-term 
growth have intensified over recent years. The financial crisis that followed the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the U.S. in 2008 was rapidly felt worldwide. More recently, the European debt crisis (in 
2011) not only threatens the existence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the stability of 
the European economy, but has affected the entire global economy. The worldwide effects of 
initially regional problems signal the downside of having a truly global financial market. The crises 
have revealed the vulnerability of national economies and global capital markets to systemic shocks 
and their devastating impact on economic growth and stability (UNEP, 2010). This has forced the 
business leaders and financial practitioners worldwide to reconsider the fundamentals of the 
traditional business and asset pricing models as the public demands for sustainable capitalism. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) have become 
topics of the day. The amounts of resources firms allocate into CSR activities have increased 
notably during the past years and often represent a substantial cost item for the companies. For 
example, General Electric spends approximately 15% of its profits on CRS-related expenses 
(Barnea et al., 2010). Unfortunately, the corporate trend of increased CSR activities is not 
necessarily good news to the investors or to the public, as the motives and consequences of such 
actions vary and even when they do signal responsible and ethical behavior, they may not lead to 
firm value maximization.  
The concept of Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) brings together the three 
main factors in evaluating the sustainability and ethical impact of an investment in a company or 
business. The relevance of analyzing ESG issues is undeniable, considering the possible financial 
impacts of these traditionally non-financial issues. White-collar crimes such as accounting fraud, 
environmental violations such as oil spills, or for example, the use of child labor or sweat shops can 
induce massive financial, legal, and reputational consequences for companies.  
In response to these concerns, The UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) were 
developed in 2005 and launched in April 2006 by Kofi Annan at the New York Stock Exchange. 
UN PRI is an investor initiative in partnership with UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global 
Compact. It is based on the idea that ESG issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios 
and therefore, institutional investors should consider them alongside more conventional financial 
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factors in order to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. By signing the UN PRI, investors commit 
themselves inter alia to developing their investment practices on the basis of the principles, taking 
into account responsibility issues in their investment decisions and acting as active owners. As of 
October 2010 over 800 investment institutions from 45 countries have become signatories. The 
long-term goal is to integrate ESG analysis into traditional financial analysis and the ESG issues 
into portfolio construction process of asset managers. (UNPRI) 
Business ethics and sustainable markets are naturally something to be encouraged for their intrinsic 
humanitarian values, but what are the financial consequences of being ethical? The number of 
academic studies in this field has increased significantly especially during the past five years, but no 
clear consensus has been reached on whether investing in socially responsible stocks or funds is 
more profitable than traditional stocks or funds. However, according to Barnea and Rubin (2010), a 
majority of existing studies have found a positive relation between CSR ratings and financial 
performance. In theory, it is possible to justify a positive, a negative, or no relationship between 
firm‟s social and financial performance (Brammer et al.).  
When evaluating the economic impact of SRI, one should consider three different perspectives: The 
investors‟, the companies‟ and the intermediary investment banks‟ perspective. For instance, for an 
investment bank, committing themselves to the UN PRI can support their reputation as responsible 
investors, but it also narrows down their investment horizon. Ultimately, the profitability of being 
responsible depends on whether or not the market values corporate social responsibility and 
corporate sustainability (CS). The companies‟ incentives to invest in CSR and CS are low, if the 
investors don‟t value their efforts. Likewise, incentives for asset managers to limit their investment 
horizon by excluding unethical stocks and funds are low, if their clients don‟t appreciate the gesture. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study and evaluate the public attitude and reactions to reportage of 
environmental, social, and corporate governance related corporate misbehavior as they externalize 
in changes in the investors‟ investing behavior.  
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1.2 Objective and research problems 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to examine and evaluate the significance of negative 
ESG-events to investors. I studied the market reactions to negative ESG news by performing an 
event study. More specifically, I examined the short- and long-term impact of the news release on 
the market value of listed companies. In addition, I evaluated how the market reaction has evolved 
over time by dividing the event window of years 1998-2007 into two five-year sub-periods and 
conducting a comparative analysis between the results. Based on earlier studies (Lougee and 
Wallace, 2008), I hypothesize that the significance of socially responsible investing, and thus the 
market‟s interest in ESG news, has increased substantially during the past decade. Thus the research 
problem of the thesis diverges into two questions defined as: 
1. How do negative ESG-news affect companies‟ stock returns in the short- and long-run? 
2. Has the market reaction to negative ESG-news changed over time? 
1.3 Contribution and main findings 
1.3.1 Contribution 
The existing literature and research in the field of CSR has mainly focused on the relationship 
between companies‟ ESG-related performance (such as CSR ratings) and stock returns, as well as 
the consequences of misdemeanor. However, there are yet few studies on the stock price effect of 
ESG-related press releases and the existing empirical evidence is varied. To my knowledge, there 
has been no previous comparative analysis between the market reactions to the three different news 
categories. 
Moreover, the focus of the earlier research has been especially on the short-term market effects and 
therefore, the most important contribution of this study is the analysis of long-term effects of ESG-
news on stock performance. While short-term stock performance is perhaps the main focus of 
interest for (short-term) investors, the long-term stock performance is of interest not only to longer-
term investors, but also the management and employees of the company. Depending on the 
compensation schemes of a specific company, variation in the returns on the firm‟s stock can 
significantly affect the compensation and thus perhaps the motivation of the employees. Naturally, 
the negative publicity and reputation that is likely to follow a revelation of a neglect or crime 
related to ESG issues, could also affect the employees‟ motivation and willingness to work for the 
company as well as clients and partners willingness to do business with that company. Also, in 
order for the management to decide on proactive and reactive measures concerning ESG-events, 
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they need to be able to estimate how the investors are going to react in longer term. Therefore, 
evaluating how investors in the market experience such events and reacts to the news in the long-
term is important from many perspectives.   
In addition, I have not thus far come across comparative analyses of datasets from different time 
periods for environmental or governance news reportage, and hence, this aspect of my study 
complements the existing research as well. The overall contribution of this thesis is to shed light on 
how investors perceive ESG-news and how their view has changed over time. 
1.3.2 Main findings 
The main findings of this research show a significantly negative market reaction in stock returns in 
the short-term (±5 days) and a significantly positive in the long-term (12, 24, and 36 months). The 
empirical results also suggest that the short-term negative reaction has intensified over the years and 
the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns have decreased. On average, the initial market 
reaction (measured with Ordinary Least Squares regression) was -2.3% (and by Generalized Least 
Squares: -1.1%) and took place four days before the news was published in a newspaper. The 11-
day cumulative abnormal returns were -3.1% (GLS: -1.3%) for the total sample. Significant buy-
and-hold abnormal returns were observed during the three post-event years (36 month BHAR 
+25%), however, significant and positive abnormal returns were not persistently present in each 
month. The news category of environmental, social or corporate governance influenced 
significantly the extent and direction of the market reaction. 
Figure 1: Short-term abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the ±5 day 
event period for the total sample portfolio estimated using the OLS regression analysis 
 
Note: Day 0 denotes the day of the publication of the news. 
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Based on the empirical results, negative ESG-news induces a significant fall in stock returns in 
short-term, but already at annual level the abnormal returns turn positive. This indicates an initial 
overreaction by the market and relatively quick recovery signaling either forgiveness or 
forgetfulness of the investors. It should be noted, however, that the results apply for a portfolio of 
irresponsible companies and thus provide a general idea of the market sentiment and are not directly 
applicable to individual cases.  
Nevertheless, it would seem that for current owners of stock this is good news, given that they are 
willing to hold to stock in their portfolio for a longer-period (e.g. a year). In the case of an ESG-
event and the corresponding news, also short-term investors should hold on to the stock until the 
returns have recovered (at least a week). Most profitable strategy would be to buy the undervalued 
stock right after the initial plunge and hold it in the investment portfolio for at least a year, 
benefiting both from buying at discount and from the buy-and-hold abnormal returns at annual level. 
The ideal holding period depends on the news category. After environmental news, the buy-and 
hold abnormal returns are highest with 12 month holding period, and after social and governance 
news, it would appear to be profitable to hold the stock for 36 months.  
From the company‟s perspective, the results are also interesting, as they would not encourage 
remedial actions at strategic or operative level. It should be kept in mind that this study analyzed 
only the investors‟ reaction to ESG-news and not for example, the customers‟ reaction. However, 
customers‟ negative reaction would most likely indirectly impact the stock prices in the form of 
decreasing sales and cash flow, which would lead to lower profits and plausibly, to lower stock 
price. Since the long-term stock returns are positive, it can be assumed that in general, the 
customers have not significantly changed their purchasing behavior after the ESG-event. Still, the 
findings of intensified negative reaction and decreased positive long-term returns over time support 
the theory of the increased role and importance of corporate social responsibility. This is likely to 
impact irresponsible companies‟ profitability, and thus CSR should be considered at least in the 
long-term strategy. 
The private and institutional investors, who have limited their investment horizon by excluding 
unethically operating companies, forgo an opportunity to exploit the overreaction of the market to 
ESG-news. Since this window of opportunity and the potential financial benefits are getting 
slimmer, the cost of responsible investment is getting smaller as well.  
The empirical results are reported in more detail in chapter 6 and their implications in chapter 8.  
6 
1.4 Limitations 
The limitations of the study relate to both the event and stock market data and methodology. 
Limitations on the data relate to the sample size, for instance. The reliability of the results and the 
statistical significance of the analysis grows with the sample size, but due to the challenges and 
limitations of collecting the data case-by-case, the sample used in this study is relatively small (123 
cases). There is a risk of selection bias in collecting the event sample, which, however, has been 
mitigated by using specific criteria for the selection process (discussed in more detail in section 4.1). 
Also the risk of failing to filter out the effects of simultaneous firm specific explanatory events can 
deteriorate the credibility of the results. Confounding or irrelevant events in the event period could 
impact the results. However, identifying all irrelevant events and excluding them would be difficult 
and might lead to only a partial adjustment. Also, Thompson (1988) concluded in his study that the 
impact of irrelevant events in the sample on the results is marginal. Thus, I have made no 
adjustments for extraneous events in this study.  
Another possible source of error is the benchmark used to estimate abnormal returns. While using 
indices is a popular choice, it is not optimal for long-term event studies. While the use of a matched 
firm control sample as the reference portfolio has proven to solve many of the problems related to 
the use of indices, the actual formation of the matched sample is subjective to certain extent (see  
4.2.2 for more detail). The influence of the benchmark portfolio on the results has been analyzed by 
conducting the long-term quantitative analyses with both a reference portfolio of matched firms and 
a reference portfolio of matched sector indices.  
The traditional limitations of event studies relate to the particular characteristics of daily stock 
return data. Potential problems are associated with, for example, non-normality of returns and 
excess returns, biased OLS estimates for market model parameters, variance shifts, and 
autocorrelation. Especially the measuring and evaluation of long-term market effects is challenging 
and prone to errors and biases such as: the survivor bias, the rebalancing bias, the skewness bias, 
and the specification bias. The limitations and difficulties regarding the long-term abnormal return 
estimations and the methodology overall are discussed in more detail in the methodology section 5. 
In order to overcome the limitations due to challenges in methodology and data, alternative 
reference portfolios and methods have been used in this study to enable a comparative and thus 
more profound analysis of the results.  
1.4 Structure of the study 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 covers a brief literature review and a discussion on its 
scope, merits and limitations. Section 3 defines and justifies the research hypotheses. Section 4 
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follows with a description of the data used in the analysis, an explanation of the data processing, 
and reasoning for the event selection is explained. Subsequently, the methodologies and model 
specifications are described in section 5. The empirical results of the event study are presented in 
section 6 and additional tests and robustness checks are reported in section 7.  Section 8 continues 
with the interpretation and analysis of results. Section 9 concludes the study and the final section 10 
suggests areas for further research.  
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Towards sustainable capitalism 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is an investment strategy that aims to maximize both 
financial returns and social good. It is related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and a growing 
number of large institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, use ethical criteria 
in their stock selection process. The investment strategies do not necessarily create a positive 
impact, but satisfy the responsibility aspect by non-harming, for example by screening out “sin-
stocks” such as those of tobacco, alcohol, and gambling industries, or stocks of companies that 
otherwise have poor CSR records. The concept of ESG summarizes the three main concerns of the 
SRI industry. 
Company specific ESG data has become more and more available during recent years as data 
providers such as Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg have started delivering such data. However, 
interpreting ESG factors and integrating ESG analysis into financial analysis of companies remains 
a challenge. Companies understand their business the best and are able to identify those ESG factors 
that are financially material and central to their business. Meanwhile, asset managers, who have 
access to the ESG data, are far less qualified in interpreting them and tend to focus on reputational 
issues. It could be the case that there are communicational problems between companies‟ 
sustainability managers and asset managers, and this would widen the gap between companies and 
investment firms even further. Until ESG becomes a part of the mainstream analysis, the lack of 
expertise and information about ESG will make sustainability reports difficult to use in company 
valuation. (UNEP FI, 2010)     
An example of a financial institution that has made sustainable banking their business is UniCredit, 
which operates the largest international banking network of approximately 50 markets and has 
strong origins in 22 European countries. The Halo‟s Creed, UniCredit's new ESG research 
methodology, is an investment philosophy based on maximizing both shareholder and broader 
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stakeholder returns. It is based on the ten thematic principles of the European Sustainable 
Development Strategy (figure 2) aiming to incorporate the effects of ESG issues into stock 
valuation and selection processes.  
Figure 2: Halo's Creed 
 
Source: UniCredit Research, 2010 
 
Based on UniCredit‟s event study analysis the efficient-market hypothesis remains weak regarding 
the information integration of ESG issues. Their study suggests that capitalized ESG issues can 
affect stock valuations by an average 1.7% and thus capital asset pricing models‟ efficiency can be 
improved by adding a sustainability dimension. By mainstreaming ESG information, stock prices 
should eventually reflect ESG-related capital flows as well as public‟s attitudes toward CSR. Once 
ESG information is mainstream and a part of company analyses, ESG related news releases should 
not impact stock prices. (UniCredit) 
Investors are naturally interested in the profitability of investing in socially responsible stocks or 
funds. From a theoretical perspective, a positive, a negative, or no relationship between firm‟s 
social and financial performance can be justified. In their study (2006), Brammer, Brooks, and 
Pavelin suggest that, assuming efficient markets, equilibrium should develop in engaging in socially 
responsible activities: The activities take place until their marginal profitability is zero. Therefore 
the returns should be the same for responsible and irresponsible companies for a given level of risk 
and other company specific characteristics.  
9 
However, consequently at the portfolio level, the investors will suffer, as the screening-out process 
will narrow their investment horizon, which reduces the efficiency of the portfolio. Then again, 
corporate social responsibility can improve firm‟s operating performance which could positive 
influence its stock price. The performance of ethical stocks or funds is thus dependent on several 
opposite forces (Brammer et al.). According to Barnea and Rubin (2010), majority of SRI related 
studies have found a positive correlation between CSR ratings and stock price performance. How 
well the CRS ratings capture the actual extent of social responsibility practiced is, however, 
debatable. 
Whether or not investors benefit from a company‟s CRS activities is also influenced by the 
management‟s underlying motives for CRS. In 2006, Amir Barnea and Amir Rubin published a 
study on CSR as conflict between shareholders. They hypothesized that a firm‟s insiders may 
induce firms to overinvest in CSR for their private benefit to the extent that doing so improves their 
reputations as global citizens and has a so called “warm-glow” effect, while they bear little of the 
cost of doing so. Their main finding was that on average, insiders‟ ownership and leverage is 
negatively related to the firm‟s social rating, while institutional ownership is uncorrelated with it. 
This supports their hypothesis assuming that the level of CSR expenditures is positively correlated 
with the firm‟s CRS rating. The conflict can be mitigated if insiders hold a large fraction of the firm 
because they would be less likely to participate in firm value reducing activity. In addition, the 
capital structure can ease the conflict as higher debt capital limits the amount of free cash flow 
available to insiders.  
Barbara Lougee and James Wallace (2008) studied the trends in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and its link to company performances in the United States during years 1992-2006. They 
found that although companies have significantly increased their CSR activities and investments, 
the number of CSR concerns has increased and thus the “net” CSR strength of companies has 
decreased. This could be interpreted as CSR activities having a positive trend but, however, the 
slope of the trend of increased CSR concerns being steeper. 
Lee and Shin (2010) studied Korean consumer behavior and observed that corporate social 
contributions and local community contributions significantly influence consumers‟ purchase 
intentions while environmental contributions by corporations did not significantly influence their 
consumer behavior. They also discovered that consumers‟ understanding of CSR activities affect 
their purchase intentions. Therefore, it should be worthwhile for companies not only to invest in 
CSR but also to consider more efficient and effective tools for communicating about their CSR 
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activities to their consumers, especially about the environmental contribution activities. (Lee and 
Shin, 2010)    
Even though the popularity of CSR has increased rapidly during recent years, social and 
environmental concerns are not novel as such. According to the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), especially the Union Carbide's releases of toxic gases in the 1984 Bhopal, 
India disaster and a smaller chemical release in the following year in Institute, West Virginia, 
increased public‟s demands for information on toxic releases outside the companies. As a response, 
the Congress established Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) under the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). It was expanded further in 1990 in the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990. TRI is a publicly available database containing information on toxic 
chemical releases and other waste management activities in the United States. By the end of 19th 
century, governments around the world had understood the requirement for environmental 
regulation in the form of mandatory information disclosure.  
Cohen and Santhakumar conducted a theoretical analysis on the power of information disclosure as 
environmental regulation in 2007. They concluded that information disclosure is likely to be more 
effective in reducing pollution when the cost of collective action is low and relative income of the 
public is high. Konar, Shameek, and Cohen studied information as means of regulation already in 
1997, and found that new information concerning a firm‟s toxic emissions that has a significant 
effect on market valuation is likely to lead to the firm to notably reduce subsequent emissions or 
otherwise to improve its environmental performance. My assumption is that if ESG-news releases 
significantly impact the stock prices of companies, the threat of media attention on ESG related 
crimes could also function as a disciplinary mechanism.  
The reputational aspect of ESG applies also to “white collar” crimes. It has been empirically shown 
by Marciukaityte, Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma (2006) that improvements in internal control 
systems following accusations of corporate fraud help repair a company‟s damaged reputation and 
reinstate confidence in the company. Market-based reputational costs of fraud were sufficient 
enough to change the composition of the board- in that sense court-induced costs are unnecessary. 
Consequences for individual managers responsible for criminal activities such as financial 
misrepresentation of firm‟s books are generally severe. In addition to criminal charges and fines 
they often face, they can lose their jobs and be barred from similar employment with other 
companies.  
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Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) found that the likelihood of being laid off is positively related to 
the size of the misconduct‟s harm to shareholders and the quality of the firm‟s governance. There is 
a positive correlation between board‟s independence and the likelihood of the fraudulent manager 
getting fired. In general, negative publicity would thus seem as something worth avoiding and when 
proactive measures fail, corrective actions are required to restore the situation. 
2.2 Stock performance of ethical stocks- a good investment? 
In the context of this study, reportage of a negative ESG event would indicate unethical behavior 
and thus label the company as unethical. The short- and long-term performance of such companies 
is interesting especially to their investors. To date, there have been multiple studies on the relative 
performance of ethical stocks and funds, but no worldwide consensus has been reached on whether 
or not they are financially sensible investments.  
Empirical studies have been conducted with different methodologies, timeframes, and data and the 
results have been mixed. For example, Schröder (2004) claims that, according to most studies by 
2004, SRI funds have similar performance with conventional funds, whereas Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) found a positive relation between CSR ratings and financial performance. Meanwhile, Geczy, 
Stambaugh and Levin (2006) are convinced that investors pay a price for investing in socially 
responsible mutual funds. Theoretically, it is possible to justify all three alternatives: similar stock 
performance, and under- or out-performance.  
Even though investors often expect “good” companies (meaning e.g. ethically responsible) to 
provide superior returns, conventional asset pricing theory disagrees. According to the theory, any 
good characteristic- such as low leverage- that is priced by the market is associated with lower 
instead of higher return expectations, because a good rating in the characteristic causes a decrease in 
the required return, which will lead to a higher current stock price and a lower future return on 
average. Then again, a characteristic not priced by the market, such as a firm‟s profit margin, would 
impact the current price, but it doesn‟t have a systematic impact on future returns. (Kaustia et al. 
2009) 
How the market perceives sustainability and social responsibility is closely related to how the 
market reaction to ESG-related news. This chapter briefly reviews the contradicting results of some 
of the previous studies on profitability of socially responsible stocks and funds. 
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2.2.1 Evidence of underperformance 
Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006) examined the relation between corporate social performance 
and long-term stock returns with UK data and came to the conclusion that companies scoring high 
on CSR appear to be poor investments. Specifically, they studied social performance scores on three 
different criteria employment, environment, and community. Their analysis showed that companies 
with high scores over all three investment horizons (of 1, 2, 3 years) have considerably lower 
average returns than the benchmarks and that financially meaningful yet statistically insignificant 
abnormal returns can be achieved by holding a portfolio of the socially least desirable stocks.  
Similarly, Boulatoff and Boyer (2009) studied the performance of environmental stocks. Their 
results suggest that, on aggregate, NASDAQ performed better than green firms. However, since 
environmental industries are growing, Boulatoff and Boyer believe their results may improve in the 
long run. Currently, solar, wind and water industries are already leading NASDAQ. (Boulatoff 
2009)  
Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2006) evaluated whether investors pay a price for investing in 
socially responsible mutual funds and found the key factors to be the fraction of their portfolios 
restricted to SRI funds and their prior beliefs about pricing models and manager skills. When the 
investor believes in multifactor models (like Fama-French, 1993) or when s/he believes that fund 
managers have skill, then the costs of SRI can be economically significant. SRI constraint can 
impose diversification costs. Investors who believe in fund managers‟ stock-picking ability, search 
return histories to identify such skill, but they incur costs because the funds with the best track 
records are not included in the investment universe of SRI funds. The costs for investing in SRI 
funds are especially high when the investor allocates his entire portfolio to those funds, but 
substantial also for an investor who allocates only a third. Mutual funds from broader fund universe 
reach closer to the size and value factors of the optimal portfolio identified by Fama-French model 
compared to SRI funds. Therefore, taken that the investor relies on these multifactor models, s/he 
will endure costs also in this perspective. (Geczy et al., 2006)  
Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2005) investigated whether or not money-flows can predict future 
fund performance. They found that SRI funds with better past returns or higher return rankings 
attract 30% higher money-inflows, while the flow-performance relation is weaker when past 
performance has been poor. According to their study, SRI investors are not sensitive to past risks or 
to the fund fees. The future performance of SRI funds is worse for funds that attract more money-
flows and for large funds. Therefore, Renneboog, Horst and Zhang claim that SRI investors chase 
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past returns and are unable to select funds that will generate superior performance. Overall, they 
believe socially responsible funds generate lower returns than conventional funds, but high 
screening intensity is likely to improve the returns of SRI funds. (Renneboog et al.) 
2.2.2. Evidence of similar performance 
Some studies, for example by Schröder (2004) and Kreander et al. (2005), and Shen and Chang 
(2009) support similar performance hypothesis. Michael Schröder compiled his dataset of the major 
SRI investment funds from the United States, Germany and Switzerland. He concluded that SRI 
funds that face screening seem to have no clear disadvantage compared to conventional assets. He 
found no difference between the risk-adjusted performance of SRI and conventional assets and thus, 
on average, the restricted investment universe doesn‟t result in a significantly lower performance. 
However, he points out that the investment strategy of SRI funds differs from conventional funds in 
the sense that they have an overweight in low market capitalization companies. Also Kreander, 
Gray, Power and Sinclair (2005) evaluated the performance of ethical and non-ethical funds by 
matched pair analysis. They used the Financial Times World Index (FTWI) that includes securities 
from 29 countries and, like Schröder, came to the conclusion that there is no difference between 
ethical and non-ethical funds according to the performance measures of risk adjusted Sharpe, 
Treynor, Jensen, and size adjusted two-index approach.  
In their fairly recent study, Shen and Chang (2009) examined the effect of CSR on firm‟s financial 
performance in Taiwan. Their results were mixed but in general, suggest that adopting CRS at least 
does not deteriorate the performance of firms. Shen and Chang also used a matched-pair analysis 
but with four criteria: The nearest-neighbor matching, the caliper matching, Mahalanobis metric 
matching, and Mahalanobis metric matching with caliper.   
2.2.3. Evidence of out-performance 
To add to the confusion, there are several studies that show empirical evidence of socially 
responsible funds and stock out-performing conventional stocks e.g. Konar and Cohen (2001), 
Statman (2000), Cheung, Tan, Ahn, and Zhang (2010). Konar and Cohen found evidence 
suggesting that there is a significant and positive relationship between environmental performance 
and the intangible asset value of publicly traded firms in the S&P 500, which they interpret as a sign 
that the market values environmental performance and companies are rewarded for taking 
environmentally responsible actions. They extended the standard economic technique of 
decomposing a firm‟s market value (based on Tobin‟s q) into its tangible and intangible assets 
(MV= VT+VI) by separating out environmental performance from the intangible assets of the firm.  
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Meir Statman (2000) compared the performance of the Domini Social Index (an index of socially 
responsible stocks) and the S&P 500 index by comparing returns, calculating Jensen‟s alphas and a 
modified version of Sharpe ratio called “excess standard-deviation-adjusted return” (eSDAR). The 
socially responsible mutual funds performed better than conventional mutual funds over the period 
of 1990-1998, but the differences in their risk-adjusted returns are not statistically significant 
(Statman, 2000). 
If socially responsible investors suffer from limited investment universe, sin stocks (i.e. of 
companies promoting or manufacturing alcohol, tobacco, or gambling) suffer from limited potential 
investors. According to Hong and Kacperczyk (2007) sin stocks are less held by norm-constrained 
institutions such as pension plans as compared to mutual or hedge funds, and they also receive less 
coverage from analysts than do stocks with otherwise comparable characteristics. Hong and 
Kacperczyk‟s study showed that there is a societal norm against funding operations that promote 
immorality, or more precisely, a price effect of 15-20% for sin stocks for being excluded by large 
institutional investors. The cost of capital of sin stocks is higher because the norm-constraint 
institutions neglect them. In addition, their expected returns are higher, since the litigation risk is 
higher for sin stocks. Therefore, based on Hong and Kacperczyk‟s study, the market value of non-
sin companies is higher, and at least not unethical would seem desirable. 
It should be taken into consideration that empirical results on the effects of social norms are likely 
to represent the lower bounds, because many companies of sin industries are aware of the cost of sin, 
such as the aforementioned neglect by institutional investors, and stay private for this reason (Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2007).  
The importance of CSR in Asian Emerging Markets was also studied by Cheung, Tan, Ahn, and 
Zhang in 2010, but in contrast to findings of Shen and Chang (2009), they found a significant 
positive relation between CSR and market valuation among Asian firms. Whereas Shen and Chang 
concentrated on companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Cheung et al. included major 
firms listed in the Asian Emerging Markets in their dataset. Broader dataset can lead to different 
results, especially when the sample comprises of companies from different markets. 
2.2.4 No consensus reached so far in literature 
To conclude, the relative material benefits from investing in SRI funds or stocks instead of 
traditional funds or stocks remain speculative. To date, there has been no universally accepted 
perception on the subject. Naturally, there are positive, immaterial externalities encouraged by 
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ethical and responsible behavior of corporations that support the preservation of our planet and 
support humanity. My approach to studying how investors perceive CSR differs from the existing 
studies, especially regarding the time span. In this research, I will study whether investors believe 
negative ESG news affect the value of the company in question in short (± 5 days) and long term (3 
years). Therefore, my focus is on the market reaction to the reporting of the event in print media and 
how it affects investors‟ perception on the company in long-term. Market value of a company can 
change either because the unethical actions change the intrinsic value of the company or simply 
because investors‟ believe they do. In addition to or instead of the irresponsible behavior, the 
intrinsic value of the firm can be affected by the consequences of the publication of the actions, 
such as loss of business or filing of lawsuits. 
2.3 Stock performance after ESG related event 
There are previous event studies on the stock performance following an ESG related events such as 
accusations of corporate fraud, filings of class-action lawsuits, and initial press announcements 
containing allegations of an environmental violation. However, the studies have focused mainly on 
short-term market effects of negative ESG events and the results have been mixed- the empirical 
evidence supports both negative impact and no-impact hypotheses. Committing fraud often leads to 
both market-based reputational costs as well as court-induced costs. Reputational costs potentially 
arise from both loss of business and fall in stock price, which are caused by investors‟ belief of the 
fraudulent company committing further crimes in the future (Marciukaityte et al.). In this chapter, 
the main findings of some of the existing studies are briefly presented and discussed.  
2.3.1 Studies on environmental incidents 
In addition to accidents, environmental incidents cover also cases such as pollution, bad green 
ratings, and toxic releases. Several previous studies have investigated good and or bad 
environmental (EV) news and effects on stock price (e.g. Diltz, 2002, Klassen and McLaughlin, 
1996, Dasgupta et al., 2001, Gupta and Goldar, 2005, Konar and Cohen, 2001). The review of 
Margolis and Walsh (2001) of 13 EV event studies summarizes well how mixed and confusing the 
existing evidence is: They found six studies documenting positive relation, three claiming negative 
relation, one with both positive and negative relation, and three studies documenting no relation 
(Lundgren and Olsson, 2010). 
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) -introduced earlier- revealed company specific pollution data 
initially in June 1989. For example Hamilton (1995) has studied whether the pollution data were 
news to journalists and investors. He defined news as the extent to which the TRI data deviated 
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from expectations about a firm‟s pollution patterns.  He found evidence that most companies did not 
receive media coverage in the general interest publications. However, the higher the pollution levels 
were, the higher was the probability of receiving media coverage. On the other hand, the TRI data 
did provide news to investors. The average abnormal return on the day TRI information was 
published was significantly negative. As with media coverage and pollution level, the number of 
different chemical submissions reported by the firms induced a larger the drop in stock value. 
Applicable both to journalists and investors, the more information available about the firms‟ 
historical pollution habits, the lower was the effect of the publication. (Hamilton, 1995) 
Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) studied the stock market effects of press announcements of 
environmental violations. Based on their study, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly claim that news about an 
environmental violation is costly to firms, and the stock value losses are similar regardless of the 
type of the environmental harm. They found that the initial press announcement in specific caused a 
significant stock price reaction- an average two-day abnormal return of -1.69%. However, these 
losses in market value correspond to the company‟s legal penalties and therefore market induced 
reputational penalties are trivial. This evidence is contradicting to the findings of Marciukaityte, 
Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma (2006) above, which showed no significant stock price reaction. It 
should be considered, however, that environmental violations differ from other types of fraud in that 
firms violating environmental regulations typically do not directly harm their stakeholders such as 
customers, employees, and suppliers. This might explain why reputational penalties are higher for 
e.g. corporate governance problems. (Karpoff et al., 2005) 
Tommy Lundgren and Rickard Olsson extended prior research by conducting a short-term event 
study on environmental (EV) incidents (event period 2003-2006) from four different geographical 
areas; Global (entire sample of 142 incidents), US, non-US, and Europe. They examined whether 
bad news affect firm value negatively as measured by abnormal returns and discovered that 
negative events are generally associated with negative returns, but which proved to be statistically 
significant only for European data. This would suggest that firm‟s stakeholders have different views 
on EV in Europe and the US. They also investigated the relationship between incident induced 
effects and EV risk rating, and found evidence implying that higher EV risk (low goodwill) is 
associated with greater loss of firm value  compared to firms with low EV risk (high goodwill). 
Lundgren and Olsson explain these results by high EV risk companies being subjected to more 
severe EV incidents. (Lundgren and Olsson, 2009) 
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In their study in 2010, Lundgren and Olsson improve their earlier study (2009) by e.g. using new 
index and factor data, non-parametric test statistics, additional normal return models including 
exchange rate factors, Fama-French factors, etc. in their event study on the same event dataset. 
However, their results were quite insensitive to the variations in methodology, and overall, their 
findings supported those of their earlier study. (Lundgren and Olsson, 2010) 
2.3.2 Studies on Social incidents 
The Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI World) comprises more than 300 companies that 
represent the top 10% of the leading sustainability companies out of the biggest 2500 companies in 
the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index. The DJSI World is reviewed annually, but there is 
also an ongoing review of the DJSI World screening extraordinary corporate actions, such as 
delisting, bankruptcy, merger, or major changes in the corporate sustainability performance, that 
could affect the composition of the index.  
In 2010, Adrian Cheung analyzed the impacts of index inclusions and exclusions on corporate 
sustainable firms by examining the 60-day returns of US stocks added or deleted from the DJSI 
World between years 2002-2008. He observed no strong evidence that announcements as such 
would have any significant impact on stock return or risk, and so he concluded that the event 
announcement does not carry information and any shift in demand is temporary. On the day of the 
announcement of inclusion or exclusion from the index, stock returns altered significantly, 
increased in case of inclusion and decreased after exclusion, but this variation quickly evened out. 
Similarly, liquidity deteriorates after the announcement, but soon bounced back. (Cheung, 2010) 
The connection between layoffs and stock prices as well as corporate performance has been studied 
by for example Farber and Hallock (2009) and Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar, and Yu (2001). More 
specifically, Chen et al. studied the stock market and earnings performance as well as operating 
performance (measured by profit margins and labor productivity) before and after layoff 
announcements published in Wall Street Journal 1990-1995. They found that layoffs are preceded 
by a period of poor stock and operating performance and followed by improvements in both. Also, 
they found that layoff announcements are followed by a significantly negative stock market reaction 
of, on average, -1.2% (two-day abnormal return). Chen et al. observed an increased corporate focus 
and concluded that layoffs are part of an overall corporate restructure to increase profitability. 
These restructures respond to shifts in demand in the product market and consequential decline in 
performance. Therefore, despite of the initial drop in the stock price, the long-term performance of 
the company as well as shareholders‟ wealth increase in the longer-term. (Chen et al. 2001) 
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Farber and Hallock (2009), on the other hand, studied how the relationship between layoff 
announcements and stock prices has changed over time during the time period 1970-1999. They 
found evidence that the stock market reaction has become less negative over the years. They explain 
this phenomenon by the fact that layoffs intended to improve efficiency are more common relative 
to those meant to reduce over capacity related to reductions in product demand. In other words, the 
layoff announcement as such is not automatically an indication of a troubled company and not 
always bad news for the investors. And even in situations where the company is in trouble, 
according to Chen et al., its performance is likely to improve after the layoff. (Farber and Hallock, 
2009)  
2.3.3 Studies on corporate governance incidents 
Marciukaityte, Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma (2006) examined whether the costs of corporate fraud 
induce changes in the accused company‟s internal control system. They focused on changes in the 
board structure, especially on the proportion of outside directors, as the changes are presumably 
intended to enhance monitoring. Their sample consisted of companies charged with government, 
financial reporting, or stakeholder fraud or regulatory violation in the US during 1978-2001. The 
main finding of the study was that improvements in internal control systems certainly followed 
accusations of fraud, which indicates that the market-based reputational costs were high enough to 
have this impact. Legal penalties are thus unnecessary for prompting a change in the board of 
directors. Making changes to the board structure helps repair a company‟s damaged reputation and 
reinstate investors‟ confidence in the company. The market reacted negatively to the accusations, 
but the abnormal returns were statistically insignificant for both short- and long-term. Marciukaityte 
et al. also studied the long-term effect of accusation on the accused company‟s operating 
performance, but found none. To sum up, the effect of the accusation of fraud extends only to the 
changes in internal control systems. (Marciukaityte, Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma, 2006) 
The duty of loyalty requires managers to act in the best interests of the corporation and not in the 
person‟s own best interest, and the duty of care requires managers to execute reasonable skills, and 
diligence in their actions. If the duty of care is being violated, shareholders can initiate lawsuits. 
Bauer and Brown (2010) analyzed various types of allegations brought forward in class-action 
lawsuits and their short and long-term effects on shareholder value. Opposite to Marciukaityte et al., 
Bauer and Brown found that shareholder litigation can lead to transformation of company 
characteristics and risk exposures as well as negative short- and long-term performance effects. The 
consequent stock price recovery depends on the type of the allegation, the time horizon, and the 
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estimation technique for long-term performance. Bauer and Brown conclude that the economic and 
financial effects of allegations that involve companies as a whole can be substantial. Interestingly, 
they observed a significant drop in the share price right before the filing of the lawsuits, indicating 
perhaps of rumors. According to the empirical evidence, on average, shareholder litigation does not 
seem to pay off in terms of stock recovery, as after a slight recovery, stock prices will continue to 
gradually decline.  
2.3.4. Expanding existing literature 
The studies discussed above have been conducted mainly on US data (apart from Lundgren and 
Olsson) and thus studying ESG events‟ effects in European markets will further shed light on 
investors‟ reaction to ESG news and complement the existing literature. Even though there are 
studies using fairly recent data (e.g. A. Cheung, 2010, data from 2002-2008), how the market 
reaction to news has changed has not been previously studied. Moreover, from the aforementioned 
studies, only Bauer and Brown studied both short- and long-term effects. From a company‟s point 
of view, when deciding on whether to behave socially responsibly, the long term effects of press 
announcements of misbehavior are more relevant than event day stock price movements.  
2.4 Market efficiency and stock returns 
The mixed empirical results from previous studies could also be explained by the traditional 
Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH). In the early sixties, Eugene Fama developed the efficient-
market hypothesis. The efficient-market hypothesis states that financial markets are efficient 
information-wise, which means that one cannot consistently achieve excess returns relative to 
average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis given the information available at the time the 
investment is made. The hypothesis implies that stock prices reflect all public information and 
instantly adjust to reflect any new information and thus provide the best possible estimate for the 
underlying value of listed companies.  
 
In his paper (1997), Eugene Fama argues that the existing studies on long-term stock return 
anomalies actually support the efficient-market hypothesis, even though one might intuitively think 
the opposite. In an efficient market, underreaction to an event should be as frequent as overreaction. 
According to Fama, the existing anomalies can be roughly evenly split in overreaction and 
underreaction. He also states that most long term return anomalies can be attributed to chance, since 
they are very sensitive to methodology. The anomalies tend to become marginal or disappear when 
measured with different methodologies and techniques. (Fama, 1997) 
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However, empirical analyses have consistently found problems with the hypothesis. Behavioral 
finance economists suggest cognitive biases and irrational behavior, which leads to inefficiencies in 
the market. Behavioral economists believe that the irrational behavior creates market breakdowns 
and buying opportunities for savvy investors. Richard H. Thaler, a behavioral economist, for 
example, says stocks can underreact to good news because investors are wedded to old views about 
struggling firms. The debate is ongoing, but the efficient-market hypothesis has become more 
difficult to defend. Since the nineties, even Fama himself has admitted that stock prices could 
become somewhat irrational (Hilsenrath, 2004). 
3. Hypotheses  
3.1 Short-term market reaction hypothesis 
The main objective of this research is to learn whether or not negative ESG news affect companies‟ 
stock returns. The market reaction (or no-reaction) will imply how investors‟ perceive and value 
corporate social responsibility. Based on the previous studies on stock performance after ESG 
related event, a negative market reaction is more plausible than a positive reaction, but the 
significance of the previous findings has varied (e.g. Marciukaityte et al., Cheung, Hamilton, and 
Karpoff et al.). The short-term market reaction hypothesis (H1) is derived from this research 
problem: 
H1: Negative ESG related company specific news induces a significantly negative reaction in stock 
returns in the short-term. 
3.2 Long-term market reaction hypothesis 
Next, the attention is directed to the extent of the (possible) market reaction. Examining abnormal 
returns over different length event windows is also informative about the post-event recovery 
process of the stock performance. Both positive and negative long-term effect can be justified ex 
ante as described earlier. Thus the long-term market reaction hypothesis (H2) diverges into two sub-
hypotheses addressing this aspect: 
H2a: The effect on stock returns of the ESG news is significantly negative in the long-term. 
H2b: The effect on stock returns of the ESG news is significantly positive in the long-term 
21 
3.3 Evolution of the market reaction hypothesis  
As the sustainable investment and CSR themes have become increasingly popular and 
acknowledged recently, it is of interest whether or not the market reaction to ESG news has 
changed during the past decade. Based on the previous studies on CRS trends (e.g. Lougee and 
Wallace, 2008), my assumption is that as investors‟ awareness and interest toward ethical behavior 
has increased, also their reaction toward negative press announcements has become stronger. From 
this assumption follows the evolution of the market reaction hypothesis (H3):   
H3: The market reaction to ESG related news has changed over time.  
4. Data description and sources 
4.1 Event data 
The ESG news data was collected case by case from LexisNexis news database. It should be noted 
that I used ESG incident reporting dates, not the actual incident dates. I formed a sample of news 
relating to companies listed in various European stock exchanges: The London Stock Exchange, the 
Frankfurt Stock exchange, NYSE Euronext, Euronext Paris, Euronext Amsterdam, the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, OMX Stockholm, OMX Helsinki, Oslo Stock Exchange, Milan Stock Exchange, and 
Borsa Italiana.  
All collected articles relating to corporate governance had been published in The Financial Times 
London Edition during the time period of 1998-2007. For social news, most were collected from 
The Financial Times as well, with a few exceptions collected from the Wall Street Journal. The 
rationalization for the choice of source is that The Financial Times is a prestigious and widely 
distributed newspaper and in published in English and thus reaches many investors.  
The environmental news articles were the most challenging to find. Because of the scarcity of such 
news in the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal (from which 30% of the environmental news 
sample was collected), environmental news were collected also from other sources, more 
environmentally conscious newspapers, such as Greenpeace International and Environment News 
Service. Environmental violations often take place in the developing countries, in areas of high the 
production, drilling, or mining concentration. It is speculative what proportion of the number of 
environmental violations occurring ever get reported and whether the news reach European markets.  
It would appear from the lack of press releases about environmental misconduct for example in the 
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Financial Times that many companies manage to cover up their unethical behavior and hide it from 
their investors. 
Since no comparative study to this research had been conducted before, the criteria for the news 
selection process could not be replicated from a previous study but had to be created for the data 
gathering. In creating the criteria and especially the search terms, I collected and combined a list of 
types of crime or keywords used in previous studies on corporate misbehavior relating to 
environmental, social, and governance issues. For example, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) 
studied the reputational penalties for environmental violations, and the types of violations included 
in their study were used in this study as search terms for environmental violations. Similarly, I 
utilized the terms related corporate governance used in the studies of Marciukaityte, Szewczyk, 
Uzun, and Varma„s, who categorized corporate fraud into stakeholder fraud, government fraud, 
regulatory violation, and financial fraud, as well as Bauer and Brown (2010), who studied 
separately stock price manipulation, accounting fraud, illegal business practices, Insider trading, 
false/misleading statements, SEO, IPO, or acquisition related, and governance problems.  
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Table 1: Criteria for news selection process 
Criteria for news selection 
Subject of the 
headline: 
Report/allegation of misbehavior/crime/neglect/unethical behavior by a company 
or its management 
Requirements for the 
company: 
Publicly listed in Europe 
Publication time: January 1
st
 1998- December 31
st
 2007 
Source: A prestigious newspaper with wide distribution, published in English 
Search terms:  
     Environmental  Toxic/hazardous/radioactive waste/spill/leak/emission/release 
 Water/air pollution 
 Contamination 
 
     Social 
 
 Child labor 
 Strikes 
 Lay-offs 
 Sexual/racial/age harassment/discrimination 
 
     Governance 
 
 Allegation, accusation, claim, charge 
 Crime, neglect, fraud 
 Tax fraud, accounting fraud, embezzlement  
 
The total sample of cases from 1998-2007 was further divided and assembled into smaller 
subsamples based on the news category and time period of publication. Therefore, the six 
assemblies of samples studied separately were: 10 year sample, 5-year period of 1998-2002 sample, 
5-year period of 2003-2007, environmental sample, social sample, and corporate governance 
sample.  The total sample size was 123 cases. The subsample size for each ESG category is 
approximately 40 news articles, and for the 5-year samples approximately 60 cases per sample. In 
each case, the focus was on the initial announcement of the misdemeanor in the print media. This is 
justified by the assumption of the market reaction being the strongest for the initial announcement. 
Naturally it is likely that news about an event reach some investors a little quicker e.g. through 
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Reuters and Internet. This is taken into account in the short term regressions by studying also the 
five days preceding the event. 
For the news article about an ESG event to be included in the sample it needs to have been selected 
by the newspaper editorial staff to perceive the event as newsworthy and publish the news. It could 
be argued that there is a selection bias present in the ESG-event sample. Selection bias, also called 
the selection effect, is a statistical bias which refers to an error in choosing the events to take part in 
a scientific study. It can lead to a distortion of a statistical analysis, which results from the method 
of collecting samples. The selection bias should be corrected for in order to ensure the validity of 
the results and the conclusions drawn from them. In this study, the bias in question could be the 
sampling bias, which is a systematic error due to a non-random sample of a population that results 
in some members of the population to be less likely to be included than others. In this biased event 
sample of a population (of events) all events are not equally balanced or objectively represented. 
However, the purpose of this study is not to study the markets‟ reaction to the event itself, but to the 
reportage of it. Therefore, it will not lead to a biased sample that events that don‟t reach the most 
prestigious print media are not included in the sample. Selection bias related to the selection process 
of the news for this study is mitigated by the use of the aforementioned criteria.  
Examples of news articles for all three categories can be found from the appendix (11.1). 
Figure 3: Division of samples into subsamples 
 
Total 10 year sample 
(1998-2007) 
Division by time of publication: 
1998-2002 2003-2007 
Division by news category: 
Environmental Social Governance 
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Figure 4: Relative division of news sample into ESG- categories 
 
Note: The size of the total sample is 123 ESG-news. 
Figure 5: Division of sample firms into different industry sectors 
 
Note: The group “other” consists of 22 MSCI Sector Indices which represent industry sectors in the sample 
represented by four or less companies. 
24 % 
38 % 
38 % 
Relative size of ESG-news samples 
Environmental 
Social 
Governance 
14 % 
10 % 
9 % 
6 % 
5 % 
4 % 4 % 4 % 
44 % 
Division of sample firms into different 
industries 
MSCI EUROPE BANKS 
MSCI EUROPE AUTOMOBILES 
MSCI EUROPE OIL, GAS & 
C.FUEL 
MSCI EUROPE T/CM SVS 
MSCI EUROPE AUTO COMPO 
MSCI EUROPE ELEC EQ  
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Figures 5 and 6 shed light on the underlying companies of the ESG news included in the sample. I 
have matched a MSCI Sector Index for each company base on their SIC (industry) codes and so I 
used the division of companies into the indices to illustrate which sectors are present in the sample 
(Figure 5). As apparent from the pie chart, the ESG news collected address companies widely from 
different industries (30 sector indices). Banks, automobile industry, and oil industry are the most 
common industries, represented by 33% of the sample companies. 
Figure 6: Division of sample firms by the stock exchange of listing 
 
Note: The numbers in the pie chart represent the number of companies in the sample listed in the particular 
exchange. 
All sample cases reported of companies that were listed in European Stock Markets at the time of 
the news reportage. Figure 5 illustrates the division of sample firms by the stock exchange of listing. 
Clearly, and predictably, the London Stock Exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and the 
Euronext Stock Exchanges are most common exchanges of listing across the sample, as they are 
across Europe as well. It should be noted that the names of the stock exchanges are written as their 
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Division of sample companies by the stock 
exchange of listing 
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current official names. Due to mergers and acquisitions of stock exchanges during the past ten years, 
the ownership and official names of exchanges have changed. Nevertheless, the country of listing at 
the time of the event for all sample firms was the same as according to the current exchange (e.g. 
Helsinki Stock Exchange has become OMX Helsinki). A complete list of companies included in the 
sample as well as their industry sector and stock exchange of listing can be found from the appendix 
(11.2). 
4.2 Stock market data 
The daily stock return data was retrieved from Thomson Reuters DataStream in the form of “total 
returns raw”, which is an index-like measure of total returns (starting from 100 on the day of listing) 
that include the return on stock as change in value as well as dividends. I computed daily 
continuously compounded logarithmic returns using the following formula: 
         
  
    
    (1) 
In equation (1), rt and rt-1 represent the total return by the date t and t-1 respectively. I used the 
logarithmic returns for their symmetry; the negative and positive percent returns are equal unlike 
with arithmetic returns. Logarithmic returns are also time additive unlike simple returns. Logging 
helps to reduce the effect of any skewness in the return distribution. This is why the logarithmic 
returns are commonly used in academic research, especially in time series analysis. The logarithm 
filters out the fundamental issue of interest more clearly for examination, which in this case is the 
fluctuation of returns. However, when forming the portfolio returns by taking averages of daily 
returns of companies in the portfolio, I used simple returns, as it is not mathematically appropriate 
to take averages of logarithmic returns. Simple returns are calculated as follows: 
    
       
    
                                                                      (2) 
Again in equation (2), rt and rt-1 represent the total return by the date t and t-1 respectively. Where I 
needed to convert simple returns to logarithmic returns or vice versa I used the following equations: 
                                                                  (3) 
and 
                                                                      (4) 
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4.2.1 Market indices 
As proxies for the European market and different industries I used the MSCI (Morgan Stanley 
Capital International) indices, more specifically, the MSCI Europe and 36 different MSCI Sector 
Indices. Since the Euro was not in use at the beginning of the time period under study, I used US 
dollar indices in order to have all indices consistently of the same currency. Since the focus is on 
the percentage difference in returns, the currency is irrelevant and doesn‟t have to be the same 
between the benchmark and the sample portfolio.  
The use of market and sector indices controls for economy-/industry-wide events and filters out the 
price effects induced by them and thus makes it easier to define price variation due to ESG events. I 
matched a sector index for each sample firm by using their SIC codes to define which industry they 
operate in. Conducting the quantitative analysis with this alternative reference portfolio in addition 
to the matched control sample (see 4.2.2) will serve as a robustness check and bring more depth to 
the analysis.  
4.2.2 Matched sample data 
A matched control sample was formed in order to control for industry specific factors as well as to 
avoid the survivor bias, the rebalancing bias, and the problem of cross- correlation in long-term 
event studies (discussed in more detail in section 5.2.1). The control firm approach eliminates the 
new listing bias as both the sample and control firm must be listed in the identified event month. It 
also solves the rebalancing bias since both the sample and control firm returns are calculated 
without rebalancing, and the skewness problem since the sample and control firms are equally 
likely to experience large positive returns.  
The matched sample consists of otherwise similar firms, but of which no ESG related news of crime 
had been published at that time. I matched company pairs based on specified firm characteristics of 
the sample company at the time of the event: The SIC (industry) Code, the market cap (size), listing 
continent (Europe), and currency (€). The best match was considered to be the company whose 
aforementioned characteristics were the most similar to the sample firm. In the search of the best 
matches, I also used the list of competitors provided by Thomson One Banker for each firm in the 
matching process.  
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4.2.3 Summary statistics 
Table 2: Summary statistics of 10 year sample portfolio returns 
Summary statistics of 10 year daily simple returns on sample portfolios 
 Total 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Mean 0.00018 0.00019 0.00018 0.00019 0.00030 0.00011 
Standard Error 0.00022 0.00023 0.00023 0.00022 0.00023 0.00027 
Median 0.00059 0.00032 0.00040 0.00042 0.00041 0.00029 
Standard Deviation 0.01318 0.01333 0.01382 0.01326 0.01374 0.01606 
Sample Variance 0.00017 0.00018 0.00019 0.00018 0.00019 0.00026 
Kurtosis 7.31050 8.90384 5.50361 10.79338 14.76458 6.41263 
Skewness -0.04689 0.05965 -0.15241 -0.10230 0.08830 -0.03368 
Range 0.21433 0.22540 0.19944 0.24650 0.32351 0.27149 
Minimum -0.10387 -0.11733 -0.09033 -0.13316 -0.15921 -0.11192 
Maximum 0.11046 0.10807 0.10912 0.11333 0.16430 0.15957 
Sum 0.60973 0.64894 0.64294 0.65167 1.05210 0.39065 
Count 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 
Conf. level (95%) 0.00044 0.00044 0.00046 0.00044 0.00046 0.00053 
Notes: The daily simple returns have been calculated from the “total return raw”-data and thus include not only the 
change in prices but also dividends.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of 10 year matched sample returns 
Summary statistics of daily simple returns on matched sample portfolios 
 Total 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Mean 0.00046 0.00050 0.00053 0.00085 0.00008 0.00029 
Standard Error 0.00027 0.00029 0.00028 0.00032 0.00029 0.00022 
Median 0.00076 0.00064 0.00067 0.00073 0.00043 0.00044 
Standard Dev. 0.01612 0.01728 0.01680 0.01906 0.01693 0.01285 
Sample Variance 0.00026 0.00030 0.00028 0.00036 0.00029 0.00017 
Kurtosis 183.52255 26.37129 170.75729 142.63934 7.18756 4.02759 
Skewness 3.32446 0.43367 3.02698 3.05153 -0.05826 -0.35609 
Range 0.73627 0.47670 0.75713 0.80905 0.26613 0.14625 
Minimum -0.30647 -0.20065 -0.32063 -0.32805 -0.11554 -0.08363 
Maximum 0.42980 0.27605 0.43650 0.48100 0.15059 0.06262 
Sum 1.60793 1.75138 1.84193 2.97197 0.26612 1.01910 
Count 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 3479 
Conf. level (95%) 0.00054 0.00057 0.00056 0.00063 0.00056 0.00043 
Notes: Notes: The daily simple returns have been calculated from the “total return raw”-data and thus include not only 
the change in prices but also dividends. 
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Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics of the daily simple returns on the sample portfolios 
and the matched sample portfolios for the 10 year period (1998-2007).  The daily simple returns 
have been calculated from the company specific raw returns that include the change in stock value 
and dividends. The portfolio returns have been calculated as daily averages of returns of the 
companies included in the samples. Total sample refers to the total sample that includes companies 
from all 123 cases and other portfolios are subsamples regrouped from the total sample. 
Over all, the matched sample portfolio would seem more volatile in terms of daily returns as the 
range is wider (0.736 vs. 0.214) and variance is higher (0.00026 vs. 0.00017) than those of the total 
sample portfolio. Across samples, there is no significant difference between standard deviations or 
means (max. 0.03%- min.0.011%). The mean return is slightly higher for the matched sample 
portfolio than the original sample. However, the differences are minor. 
However, regarding skewness and kurtosis the sample and matched sample differ somewhat. 
Positive skewness indicates that the probability of increases in returns is higher than decreases. The 
total sample skewness is approximately -0.047, while skewness of the matched sample is 3.33.  The 
sign of the skewness varies also across samples.  For the original samples, skewness is either 
slightly positive or slightly negative. For the matched samples, skewness is either slightly negative 
or notably positive.  
Kurtosis indicates the "peakedness" of the probability distribution and therefore a low kurtosis 
distribution has a rounded peak and shorter, thinner tails while high kurtosis distribution would 
mean a sharper peak and longer, fatter tails. The kurtosis for the matched portfolio is significantly 
higher than for the original sample. This means that the Kurtosis risk is higher with the matched 
sample. The kurtosis risk means that the observations are spread wider compared to the normal 
distribution, which means that fewer observations cluster near the average, and more observations 
are placed in the extremes either far above or far below the average. However, since the matched 
sample is not used in the OLS regressions- which assumes normality of cumulative abnormal 
returns- this will not be an issue.  
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Table 4: Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily returns on sample portfolios 
Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily simple returns on sample portfolios 
 Total 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Mean 0.00058 0.00075 0.00050 0.00080 0.00032 0.00069 
Standard Error 0.00012 0.00021 0.00015 0.00023 0.00014 0.00025 
Median 0.00052 0.00034 0.00042 0.00059 0.00030 0.00026 
Standard Deviation 0.00330 0.00588 0.00416 0.00627 0.00372 0.00695 
Sample Variance 0.00001 0.00003 0.00002 0.00004 0.00001 0.00005 
Kurtosis 34.67896 94.64219 4.02287 5.60848 -0.18867 98.37783 
Skewness 3.05804 6.28508 0.49255 0.93321 0.10854 6.63204 
Range 0.05170 0.11133 0.04217 0.06292 0.02188 0.13183 
Minimum -0.00934 -0.01504 -0.01725 -0.02413 -0.01036 -0.01761 
Maximum 0.04236 0.09629 0.02492 0.03878 0.01152 0.11421 
Sum 0.43256 0.56219 0.37803 0.60244 0.23778 0.52076 
Count 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Conf. level (95%) 0.00024 0.00042 0.00030 0.00045 0.00027 0.00050 
Notes: The daily simple returns have been calculated from the “total return raw”-data and thus include not only the 
change in prices but also dividends.    
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily returns on matched sample portfolios 
Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily simple returns on matched sample portfolios 
 Total 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Mean 0.00036 0.00050 0.00034 0.00074 0.00020 0.00029 
Standard Error 0.00009 0.00014 0.00011 0.00016 0.00014 0.00015 
Median 0.00026 0.00056 0.00028 0.00065 0.00004 0.00018 
Standard Deviation 0.00236 0.00391 0.00315 0.00436 0.00392 0.00415 
Sample Variance 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
Kurtosis 0.29554 0.43986 1.34083 0.56555 0.04128 0.33620 
Skewness 0.12854 -0.03330 -0.01982 0.17611 0.01911 0.22564 
Range 0.01754 0.02758 0.02794 0.03284 0.02217 0.02710 
Minimum -0.00655 -0.01340 -0.01297 -0.01512 -0.01147 -0.01080 
Maximum 0.01099 0.01418 0.01497 0.01772 0.01069 0.01630 
Sum 0.27407 0.37339 0.25709 0.55312 0.14915 0.21996 
Count 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Conf. level (95%) 0.00017 0.00028 0.00023 0.00031 0.00028 0.00030 
Notes: The daily simple returns have been calculated from the “total return raw”-data and thus include not only the 
change in prices but also dividends.    
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Table 6: Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily returns on MSCI Index reference 
portfolios 
Summary statistics of 3 year post-event daily simple returns on MSCI index reference portfolios 
 Total 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Mean 0.00033 0.00026 0.00041 0.00046 0.00028 0.00030 
Standard Error 0.00006 0.00008 0.00009 0.00012 0.00010 0.00010 
Median 0.00030 0.00027 0.00036 0.00040 0.00031 0.00034 
Standard Deviation 0.00166 0.00229 0.00251 0.00320 0.00287 0.00277 
Sample Variance 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
Kurtosis 0.38378 0.42607 1.23155 2.33699 0.63414 1.08224 
Skewness 0.23429 0.28905 0.30900 0.27539 0.15417 0.06905 
Range 0.01187 0.01575 0.01893 0.03332 0.02210 0.02262 
Minimum -0.00414 -0.00588 -0.00652 -0.01357 -0.01038 -0.00838 
Maximum 0.00774 0.00987 0.01241 0.01975 0.01172 0.01424 
Sum 0.24953 0.19772 0.30931 0.34803 0.21126 0.22438 
Count 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Conf. level (95%) 0.00012 0.00016 0.00018 0.00023 0.00021 0.00020 
Notes: The daily simple returns have been calculated from the “total return raw”-data and thus include not only the 
change in prices but also dividends.    
 
Tables 4-6 depict the summary statistics of the 3 year post-event daily returns on the sample 
portfolios and the reference portfolios compiled of the matched firms or matched indices.  Sample 
variances are close to zero for all samples, perhaps slightly smaller for the reference portfolios. The 
reference samples are quite similar in terms of summary statistics: Mean (0.00033 vs. 0.00036), 
range (0.01187 vs. 0.01754) and standard deviation (0.00166 vs. 0.00236).  For the original sample, 
the statistics are a somewhat higher.  
Again, the most significant difference comes in form of skewness and kurtosis statistics.  For 
reference sample, skewness and kurtosis are low and positive. For the original sample, the skewness 
and kurtosis are positive and significantly higher (3.06 and 34.68).  
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5. Methodology 
5.1 Short-term event study to determine abnormal returns 
A popular methodology of measuring the effect of an event from financial market data is the event 
study methodology. The event study has many applications and has been widely used in accounting 
and finance research in measuring the market value effects of both firm specific and economy wide 
events ever since the 1930s (MacKinlay 1997). For example, Brown and Warner based their studies 
on the event study methodology (1980, 1985) when examining the properties of daily stock returns 
and the effect of specific data characteristics in methodologies for assessing the share price impact 
on firm-specific events. In 1997, A. Craig MacKinlay studied the applicability of the event study 
methodology and his formulas are roughly followed in this research.  
Conducting an event study begins with defining the events, the event windows, and the estimation 
windows. The event window refers to the time period over which the behavior of equity returns are 
examined. In order to define the normal behavior of returns, I used an estimation window of 120 
days preceding the event window. There are several techniques for determining the abnormal 
returns such as the constant mean model and the market model. In this study I used the market 
model.  
The purpose of this study is to measure the market reaction to different types of news at different 
times and not the market impact of a particular event on a particular stock. Therefore, after defining 
the abnormal returns over the event period for each stock, I formed portfolios by aggregating the 
daily abnormal returns for each sample and subsample. Thus, the analysis of the abnormal changes 
in returns is conducted on a portfolio level rather than per each case and each stock separately. 
In this study, returns of the MSCI Europe index represent the market returns in the market model 
and are thus used in the estimation of the abnormal returns. Because the index returns were reported 
mainly on monthly basis until 2001, I conducted the short term event study (that focuses on daily 
returns) for a shorter time period of 2001-2007. 
5.1.1 The market model 
In this research a standard market model event study was conducted to measure the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) induced by the press releases. The event period was ±5 days in order to 
analyze any short-term changes in abnormal returns as well as to observe whether a news release 
was anticipated (pre-event abnormal returns). The market model was defined separately for each 
case. The market model used is defined as follows: 
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               (5) 
The rit and rmt in (5) refer to the period-t returns on stock (i) and the market portfolio 
correspondingly. The market parameters α and  were estimated by regressing the 120-day 
estimation period returns of the stock against the market returns (MSCI Europe) of that time period 
using the standard linear ordinary least squares (OLS)- regression. The OLS-technique minimizes 
the sum of squared distances between the observed responses in the data set and the fitted responses 
from the regression model.  
The abnormal returns were defined as: 
                     (6) 
In (6) α and β are the estimated parameters from the regression model. After the event window 
abnormal returns were defined for each 123 cases, I calculated the ARs for the six samples by 
taking arithmetic averages of the daily abnormal returns for each ±5 days of all stocks included in 
the specific sample. Then I calculated the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the 
corresponding variances and standard deviations for each sample for the event window period. 
5.2.3 Conducting the hypothesis tests 
Next step in the event study is to analyze whether the estimated abnormal returns due to the event 
are statistically significant. The hypotheses under examination are as follows: 
H0: The event has no impact on the stock returns (AR = 0) 
H1: The event has an impact on the stock returns (AR  0) 
Under the H0 the distribution of the cumulative abnormal return is: 
                  
 
            (7) 
In (7), i denotes the security, t1 and t2 denote the event period.  
In order to test the hypothesis, the z-value is calculated using the following equation: 
   
     
         
      (8) 
Under the null hypothesis   = 0, and thus is omitted from the formula.  
H0 is rejected at significance level of 95% when z-value is ± 1.96, and H0 is rejected at significance 
level of 99% when z-value is ± 2.57. 
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5.2 Methods for testing long-run abnormal returns  
5.2.1 Challenges of long-term tests 
All event studies must tackle the following issues: Risk adjustment and abnormal return modeling, 
the aggregation of security-specific abnormal returns, and the calibration of statistical significance 
of abnormal returns. However, the significance of these issues amplifies with long horizons. For 
example, a small error in risk adjustment can make a huge difference in the estimated abnormal 
returns over horizons over one year. On the contrary, for short-term, misestimating the portfolio‟s 
beta can cause only relatively small errors in calculating abnormal returns. Modeling expected 
returns is always challenging and to quote Fama (1998): “All models for expected returns are 
incomplete descriptions of the systematic patterns in average returns. The purpose of the event 
study is specifically to isolate the effects of the event from the other determinants of the stock 
performance. (Kothari et al. 2006)    
In comparison to short-term returns, testing long-run abnormal stock returns is far more 
complicated. Traditional methods often yield misspecified test statistics because of five main 
causes: (1) the new listing or survivor bias, (2) the rebalancing bias, (3) the skewness bias, (4) 
cross-sectional dependence, and/or (5) a bad model for asset pricing. If and how the aforementioned 
factors induce misspecification depends on the method used to determine abnormal returns.  
Usually, survivor bias leads to positive bias in the test statistic, and the rebalancing and skewness 
biases create a negative bias. The source of the survivor bias is that in long-run event studies the 
sampled firms are tracked for a post-event period, whereas firms that make up the reference 
portfolio begin trading following to the event month. It is common to assume periodical rebalancing 
in calculating the compound returns of the reference portfolio, while the returns of the sample firms 
are compounded without rebalancing. This leads to the rebalancing bias. (Lyon et al. 1999)  
In the long-term, the skewness bias is problematic especially for buy-and-hold returns as the lower 
bound is -100% and there is no upper bound for returns, which will lead to right-skewed 
distribution of abnormal returns. Specification bias arises from the cross-correlation in returns is 
also a serious problem in measuring long-term abnormal returns. Long-term abnormal returns tend 
to be cross-correlated for the following three reasons: (1) due to the long measurement period, 
abnormal returns of subsamples are likely to share a common event period; (2) events don‟t 
distribute evenly over time but tend to exhibit waves (especially corporate events like M&A); (3) 
some industries might be over-represented in the sample. (Kothari et al.  2006) 
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John DF. Lyon, Brad M. Barber, and Chih-Ling Tsai studied improved methods for tests of long-
run abnormal stock returns (1999). They focused on the two main methods for assessing post-event 
risk-adjusted performance: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and the calendar-time portfolio 
approach also known as Jensen‟s alpha approach. Both methods aim to tackle the factors causing 
misspecification. BHAR approach answers the question whether the sample portfolios earned 
abnormal returns over the time horizon under analysis, and thus buy-and-hold returns resemble the 
investors‟ actual experience. Alternatively, the calendar-time portfolio approach denotes whether 
the sample portfolios persistently earn abnormal monthly returns. The two methods have their 
advantages and disadvantages (discussed below), and for the sake of thoroughness and more 
profound analysis, both are used in this study. 
5.2.2 The buy-and-hold approach 
The buy-and-hold approach uses a traditional event study frameworks and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns calculated using reference portfolios. The reference portfolio consists of the matched sample. 
It is constructed so that the population mean abnormal return for the reference portfolio is zero. The 
use of sample portfolios and reference portfolios alleviates the survivor bias since the companies in 
the portfolios remain the same, the rebalancing bias as there is no rebalancing since the reference is 
a portfolio (of fixed matched firms) instead of an index, and finally, the problem of cross- 
correlation because the events are independent, rarely overlap, and are drawn from multiple 
different industries. The skewness problem would be eliminated by the use of matched sample since 
the sample and control firms are equally likely to experience large positive returns. However, in the 
case of buy-and-hold returns, the skewness bias is likely to remain (Lyon et al. 1999). This is taken 
into account by the use of a skewness-adjusted t-statistic. For the sake of more throughout analysis, 
I estimated the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) also with the sector indices. Even though 
the use of indices in long-term event studies is problematic (the new listing or survivor bias, the 
rebalancing bias), the construction of the matched sample is somewhat subjective despite of the 
strict criteria and poses some challenges as well. I believe that a comparative analysis between the 
results will lead to a more accurate conclusion. 
5.2.2.1 Calculation of abnormal returns 
From the daily returns I calculated the long-horizon returns for 12-, 24-, and 36-month holding 
periods by first calculating the mean monthly returns for each 120 companies, their matched pairs, 
and matched sector indices, and then compounding the mean returns over the holding period. In 
order to calculate the monthly returns I converted the simple returns to logarithmic returns that are 
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time additive (see equation 4 in section 4.2). Once the monthly logarithmic returns were computed, 
I converted them back to simple returns (see equation 3 in section 4.2) in order to compound the 
mean monthly returns over the holding period. As the conventional number of trading days in a year 
is 250, I defined trading days per month as 21 days. I used the following equation to define the 
portfolio long-horizon returns: 
           
     
  
   
 
  
             (9) 
In equation (9) s is the beginning of the period, T is the period of investment in months (12, 24, 36), 
Rit is the return on security i in month t, and n is the number of securities in month t.  
Next I calculated the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns denoted as: 
                     (10) 
In (10) ARit is the T period buy-and-hold abnormal return for company i, Rit is the period T buy-
and-hold return on the company i, E(Rit) is the period T expected return for company i, which is 
estimated by using the returns of the matched firm. As mentioned above, in addition to the matched 
firm, I also used MSCI Sector Indices matched for each sample firm to estimate the period T 
expected return. The returns for the matched stock and indices were collected from the same time 
period (the event period) as for the sample company. 
5.2.2.2 Statistical tests 
To test the significance of different sample portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal returns, I used the 
company specific BHAR‟s to calculate the t-values for the six portfolios for the three holding 
periods. A conventional t-statistic is often used to test a null hypothesis that abnormal returns for 
the sample portfolio equals zero.  
  
         
      
  
    (11) 
where           is the sample mean and σ(ART) is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of 
abnormal returns for the sample portfolio of n firms.  
However, because long-run buy-and-hold returns are positively skewed, the t-statistic tends to be 
negatively biased. In order to eliminate this bias, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) recommend using a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic: 
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where  
  
      
      
  and   
                 
  
   
        
   
In equation (12)   S is the conventional t-statistic and   is the estimate of the coefficient of 
skewness. This modified test statistic is based on Edgeworth Expansion and was developed by 
Johnson in 1978. It has been studied also by Hall (1992) and Sutton (1993). (Lyon et al. 1999) 
I calculated the skewness-adjusted t-values for each six samples and for both versions of BHAR 
approach (matched firm return vs. index return as the expected return) and used the results to 
evaluate the statistical significance of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (see section 6.2 for results).  
5.2.3 The calendar-time portfolio method 
The calendar-time portfolio approach is based on calculation of mean monthly abnormal returns 
using calendar-time portfolios and a time-series t-statistic. It was first introduced by Jaffe (1974) 
and Mandelker (1974) and has been since supported by many finance researchers including Fama 
(1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). The calendar-time portfolio method has the following 
advantages it possesses over the BHAR approach. First, the method eliminates the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence among sample firms since the returns of the sample firms are 
aggregated into a single portfolio. However, in this study this is trivial since I have used a matched 
control sample also in the buy-and-hold approach. Secondly, the calendar-time portfolio method 
yields more robust test statistic in nonrandom samples. Finally, mean monthly abnormal returns are 
less skewed than buy-and-hold returns and thus less problematic statistically. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are less skewed than buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and thus even the conventional t-
statistics yield well specified test statistics. The calendar-time portfolio method is also immune to 
the specification bias arising from cross-correlated abnormal returns because of the use of calendar-
time portfolios. (Lyon et al. 1999) 
There are two variations of calendar-time portfolio methods: One based on the Fama-French three 
factor model and one based on the use of mean monthly calendar-time abnormal returns. Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai argue that the calendar-time portfolio method based on reference portfolio 
abnormal returns dominate over the method of using Fama-French three factor model. Their 
rationale is based on the limitations of the Fama-French approach: It assumes linearity in the 
constructed market, size, and market-to-book factors, and it also assumes no interaction between the 
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three factors. Therefore, I decided to use the reference portfolio abnormal returns, both matched 
firm portfolios and sector index portfolios, utilized already in the BHAR approach in this calendar-
time portfolio approach as well. A reference portfolio will therefore consist of the matched pairs for 
each sample company, either the appropriate sector index or matched firm. (Lyon et al. 1999) 
5.2.3.1 Mean monthly calendar-time abnormal returns 
I computed the daily returns for the different sample portfolios and their corresponding reference 
portfolios of matched firms and the portfolios of matched MSCI indices for the holding period 
(event day + 12/24/36 months) by calculating the averages of the daily simple returns. Again, I had 
to convert the returns back to logarithmic returns in order to calculate the monthly returns for each 
six portfolios. Next, the mean monthly logarithmic returns for each six portfolios and for each 
month 1-36 of the holding period were calculated.  
I defined the abnormal returns by comparing the daily portfolio returns to those of the two reference 
portfolios, of matched firms and of matched sector indices. 
                                                                           (13) 
where ARit is the daily abnormal return on the portfolio i, Rit is the daily return on portfolio, and Rpt 
is the daily return on the reference portfolio. The mean abnormal monthly return is defined as: 
          
  
                                                                (14) 
where n is the number of days in month t. I weighted abnormal returns equally. Since I started off 
with monthly return data, I was able to compute the MARs by applying equation (13) directly to the 
monthly returns.  
Finally, I calculated the grand mean monthly abnormal returns (MMAR): 
     
 
 
     
 
                                                             (15) 
where t denotes the month, and T the total number of months (12, 24, 36). 
5.2.3.2 Statistical tests 
To test the null hypothesis of zero mean monthly return; I calculated the t-statistic using the time 
series standard deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns: 
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                                                             (16) 
Similar to the procedure in the BHAR approach, I calculated the t values for each 12-, 24-, and 36-
month periods to form a better understanding of the long-term effect of the ESG events. 
5.3 Limitations and critique of methodology 
Heteroscedasticity may bias the results in the event study. When using the ordinary least squares 
technique, one of the assumptions is that the error term has a constant variance. However, with time 
series data, the error terms often have different variables. Heteroscedasticity can lead to 
underestimation of the variance of the coefficients and, thus, standard errors. With heteroscedastic 
data, the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent but it is not the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE) of the Gauss-Markov theorem (Dougherty, 2007). It nevertheless describes the relationship 
between the variables well, but cannot reliably estimate the statistical significance of the 
relationship. The use of the log of the data lessens heteroscedasticity. The White‟s test is used to 
detect heteroscedasticity (see section 7 for robustness checks). 
In the event study analysis, it is assumed that the error terms are uncorrelated. However, this is 
often inappropriate assumption for time series data. Autocorrelation refers to the correlation of a 
time series with its own past and future values. This would imply that a time series is predictable. 
The problem of autocorrelation arises, when the disturbance terms are autocorrelated.  Standard 
regression model includes the assumption of independent disturbance terms between observations. 
This might lead to biased results. Positive autocorrelation, for example, would lead to 
underestimation of the standard errors and the t-values will be biased upwards. The variance of the 
error term would also be underestimated so that R squared will be exaggerated. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic will be constructed to test for autocorrelation (see section 7 for robustness checks). 
With BHAR-approach, the especially problem skewness can bias the results. As Barber and Lyon 
(1997a) stated, long-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positively skewed and this positive 
skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. The use of the matched control firm portfolio and 
skewness-adjusted t-test conducted in this study reduces the bias, but the test statistic might still not 
be well-specified. 
Even though the calendar time portfolio approach has many advocates, it has also been criticized. 
For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that it might be biased toward finding results 
consistent with market efficiency (Kothari and Warner, 2006). They explain their view by stating 
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that managements time the events to exploit mispricing, but the calendar time portfolio approach 
under-weights manager‟s timing decisions and over-weights other observations by forming 
calendar-time portfolios. However, this is unlikely to cause a significant error in this study, as the 
managements‟ abilities to control press releases are limited. 
Relating to the calendar-time portfolio approach, there is a problem with variance shifts: Events are 
generally likely to be connected with variance increases, in other words, the abnormal returns 
varying across sample stocks. Variance shifts can lead to misspecification that in turn can cause the 
null hypothesis to be rejected too often. Therefore, it is difficult to reliably determine whether high 
abnormal returns are the result of chance, mispricing or a bad model (Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
Another shortcoming of the calendar time portfolio model is that relative to earlier research, the 
power of the tests is still low (Jegadeesh and Karceski, 2004).  
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6. Empirical results 
In this chapter, I will report the empirical results from the short- and long-term statistical analysis of 
the event data. Further analysis and implications of the results will be presented and in chapter 8.  
6.1 Short-term 
6.1.1 Short-term event study results 
Figure 7: Abnormal returns from the ±5 day event window for time period portfolios 
 
Note: Day 0 denotes the day of the publication of the news. 
Figure 8: Abnormal returns from the 11-day event window for news category portfolios 
 
Note: Day 0 denotes the day of the publication of the news. 
-3.0 % 
-2.5 % 
-2.0 % 
-1.5 % 
-1.0 % 
-0.5 % 
0.0 % 
0.5 % 
1.0 % 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
A
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
re
tu
rn
s 
%
 
Event window ±5 days 
Abnormal returns (%) from event window of ±5 days for 
time period portfolios 
2001-2007 
2001-2004 
2005-2007 
-4.5 % 
-4.0 % 
-3.5 % 
-3.0 % 
-2.5 % 
-2.0 % 
-1.5 % 
-1.0 % 
-0.5 % 
0.0 % 
0.5 % 
1.0 % 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
A
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
re
tu
rn
s 
%
 
Event window ±5 days 
Abnormal returns (%) from event window of ±5 days for 
news category portfolios 
Environmental 
Social 
Governance 
43 
Figures 7 and 8 depict the daily abnormal returns over the ±5-days event window on the six sample 
and subsample portfolios estimated by the OLS regression using the market model. Interestingly, it 
can be observed that the initial market reaction takes place on the day -4, that is to say, four days 
preceding the publication of the news article. Despite the fact that these portfolios compose of 
various different cases (ESG news) concerning different companies and different time periods, the 
day of the initial market reaction is same for all portfolios. This suggests that the information about 
the event has spread out through different, faster channels of media than print media, most likely the 
Internet and very up-to-date professional investor sources as Reuters. It is also apparent that on 
average, the reaction has been dramatically and consistently (across sample portfolios) negative on 
the day -4, but has quickly bounced back, however to a lower than initial level of returns. The quick 
recovery on day -3 could suggest an increased demand for the stock, which is likely to be 
underpriced as a result of the plunge on day -4. Increased demand would then push up the prices. 
Studying the figures 6 and 7, it would also seem that during the days following the event (day 0), 
there is clear volatility in abnormal returns signaling of the uncertainty and speculation in the 
market that the event has caused.  
Comparing the initial (day -4) market reaction across the different categories of ESG news, news 
about environmental violations has had the most dramatic negative effect on returns (-3.864%), 
whereas news about social misbehavior has had the least impact on returns (-0.19%). Overall, the 
initial market reaction (on day -4) for the total sample is -2.313%. After the recovery on day -3 until 
day +3, the behavior of abnormal returns would seem quite random, but again on the day +4, all 
portfolios faced a drop in returns. This could mean that more information has been published about 
the incident and the likely implications to the firm and/or its shareholders have become clearer. It 
can also be concluded from the abnormal returns for portfolios 2001-2004 and 2005-2007, that 
investors‟ short-term reaction to ESG news has become more dramatic over the years.  
Only for samples “governance” and “2001-2004” is there a visible drop in abnormal returns on the 
day zero, which is the day of the publication of the article.  For portfolio 2001-2004 this was to be 
expected as the role of paper media was still more significant in the beginning of the 21
st
 century 
compared to the second half of the decade, due to the rapid development of information technology.  
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Figure 9: Cumulative abnormal returns from the ±5 day event window for time period 
portfolios 
 
Note: Day 0 denotes the day of the publication of the news. 
Figure 10: Cumulative abnormal returns from the ±5 day event window for news category 
portfolios 
 
Note: Day 0 denotes the day of the publication of the news. 
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Figures 9 and 10 depict the cumulative abnormal returns from the 11-day event window on the six 
sample and subsample portfolios. The figures illustrate the investors‟ experience if s/he holds the 
portfolio over the event window. For the total sample the cumulative abnormal return over the event 
window is -3.129%. Similar to figures 7 and 8 of abnormal returns, it is obvious from these graphs 
that the market reaction to negative environmental news is the most significant and least significant 
for news from the social category. Cumulative abnormal returns turn positive during the event 
window only for social news (1.102%) and stay negative for all other portfolios. It is also clear from 
figure 9 that the cumulative abnormal returns induced by ESG news have become notably more 
negative during recent years than in the beginning of the decade. 
Table 7 (on the next page) summarizes the day-specific abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
for the ±5-day event window for all six portfolios estimated by the short-term OLS regression 
analysis with the market model.  The same information was illustrated by figures 7-10.  
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Table 7: Cumulative abnormal returns on the six portfolios for the ±5 day event period 
The table depicts the abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the event period on all six portfolios (that illustrate the 
average subsample returns) defined by the short term OLS regression. Day 0 denotes the day the news article was published.  
AR and CAR on portfolios over event period 
 2001-2007 2001-2004 2005-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Event day AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
-5 0.384 % 0.384 % 0.710 % 0.710 % 0.085 % 0.085 % 0.244 % 0.244 % 0.359 % 0.359 % 0.547 % 0.547 % 
-4 -2.313 % -1.929 % -1.821 % -1.111 % -2.736 % -2.651 % -3.864 % -3.620 % -0.190 % 0.170 % -2.885 % -2.337 % 
-3 -0.249 % -2.178 % -0.067 % -1.178 % -0.392 % -3.043 % -0.383 % -4.003 % 0.370 % 0.540 % -0.734 % -3.071 % 
-2 -0.526 % -2.704 % -1.027 % -2.205 % 0.044 % -2.999 % -0.218 % -4.221 % -0.476 % 0.064 % -0.884 % -3.956 % 
-1 -0.169 % -2.873 % -0.027 % -2.232 % -0.329 % -3.329 % -0.628 % -4.849 % -0.512 % -0.448 % 0.632 % -3.323 % 
0 -0.230 % -3.104 % -0.388 % -2.619 % -0.096 % -3.425 % 0.214 % -4.634 % 0.180 % -0.268 % -1.085 % -4.408 % 
1 0.103 % -3.000 % 0.360 % -2.260 % -0.172 % -3.597 % -0.018 % -4.652 % 0.484 % 0.216 % -0.156 % -4.565 % 
2 0.133 % -2.867 % 0.191 % -2.069 % 0.064 % -3.532 % 0.159 % -4.493 % 0.398 % 0.615 % -0.158 % -4.723 % 
3 0.344 % -2.523 % 0.567 % -1.502 % 0.052 % -3.480 % 0.375 % -4.118 % 0.416 % 1.031 % 0.242 % -4.480 % 
4 -0.453 % -2.975 % -0.328 % -1.830 % -0.569 % -4.050 % -0.271 % -4.389 % -0.258 % 0.773 % -0.829 % -5.309 % 
5 -0.154 % -3.129 % -0.362 % -2.193 % 0.062 % -3.987 % -0.563 % -4.952 % 0.329 % 1.102 % -0.227 % -5.536 % 
Notes: The abnormal returns have been defined by using the market model OLS regression with 120-day estimation period. 
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Table 8: Statistical analysis of short term abnormal returns 
The table depicts the cumulative abnormal returns over the 11-day event period and their 
corresponding variances, standard deviations and z-values as well as the statistical significances of 
z-values.  
Statistical analysis of abnormal returns 
Portfolio CAR VAR(CAR) StDev(CAR) Z-value Significance 
2001-2007 -3.13 % 0.0001 0.010 -3.089 *** 
2001-2004 -2.19 % 0.0001 0.009 -2.371 *** 
2005-2007 -3.99 % 0.0001 0.011 -3.526 *** 
Environmental -4.95 % 0.0002 0.015 -3.413 *** 
Social 1.10 % 0.0000 0.005 2.223 ** 
Governance -5.54 % 0.0003 0.017 -3.232 *** 
Notes: The rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 95% significance level is denoted as **, and the rejection at 
99% significance level is denoted as ***. Estimation window of 120 days was used to estimate the market model. 
Table 8 represent the results of the statistical analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns estimated 
using the OLS regression with the market model. For all portfolios, the null hypothesis of abnormal 
returns being zero is rejected. This result implies that there is a significant market reaction to 
negative ESG news that affects the returns for at least until five days have passed since the event. 
For all portfolios but social news, the 11-day cumulative abnormal return was negative and 
statistically significant at level 99%. Interestingly enough, for the social portfolio, the cumulative 
abnormal returns were positive and statistically significant at 95% level. This suggests that the stock 
price of companies that have experienced negative social issue-related publicity recover the 
quickest after the initial plunge.  
When comparing 11-day CARs for the two consecutive time period samples 2001-2004 and 2005-
2007, it can be observed that the short-term cumulative abnormal returns induced by the ESG news 
have become more negative and more statistically significant over the years.  
The short term CARs are the lowest (-5.54%) for corporate governance news sample of the three 
categories. The CAR for the environmental sample is the second lowest with -4.95%, while the 
CAR for social sample is +1.1%. This result could be related to the direct costs likely to be induced 
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by white-collar crimes and environmental accidents, as well as to cost savings often related to social 
incidents such as layoffs due to process restructuring. 
6.1.2 Top and bottom 5cases 
The news cases which induced the five highest and lowest cumulative abnormal returns over event 
period of ±5 days are listed in tables 9 and 10 below. 
Table 9: Top 5 ESG-news cases ranked by the highest cumulative abnormal returns 
Top 5 Company News date News headline Category 
Event period 
CAR 
1 Capgemini 13.10.2001 
Cap Gemini plans to cut 600 
more jobs 
Social +31.02 % 
2 Groupe Partouche 31.12.2004 
Casino staff (of 17 000) threaten 
strike 
Social +9.32 % 
3 Adecco 20.1.2004 
Swiss watchdog opens probe 
into insider trading at Adecco 
Governance +9.19 % 
4 
British Midland 
Airways Ltd 
13.6.2003 
BMI to cut 1,200 jobs and bring 
its baby south 
Social +8.37 % 
5 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria 
17.7.2002 
US probes alleged money 
laundering by BBVA 
Governance +7.96 % 
(6 Prudential PLC 3.11.2001 Prudential to axe 2,100 jobs Social +7.89 %) 
 
Table 10: Bottom 5 ESG-news cases ranked by the lowest cumulative abnormal returns 
Bottom 5 Company News date News headline Category 
Event period 
CAR 
1 
Koninklijke Ahold 
Nv (Royal Ahold) 
28.2.2003 
Group's former chief accused 
of embezzlement  
Governance -65.63 % 
2 Xerox Corp 12.4.2002 
Xerox 'used accounting 
tricks'  
Governance -16.08 % 
3 TJ Group Plc.  27.1.2005 
Finnish State Prosecutor 
raises charges against TJ 
Group 
Governance -14.77 % 
4 AstraZeneca 21.6.2003 
Drug maker pays Dollars 
355m in fraud probe 
Governance -12.65 % 
5 
Morgan Crucible 
Co Plc. 
17.10.2006 
Former chief executive 
appeals against US 
extradition 
Governance  -11.90 % 
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(6 BP Plc. 24.8.2002 
Authorities in Alaska probe 
BP site blast  
Environmental -10.34 %) 
 
As stated, the aim of this study was to analyze the general market sentiment toward negative ESG-
news instead of studying the individual cases. At a specific company level there are various factors 
and events going on at all times that are likely to affect the share prices to some extent. However, 
when these cases are analyzed as a large group, individual noise will moderate. Thus, the lists of 
cases that have induced the highest and lowest cumulative abnormal returns, presented on the 
previous page, are simply intended to give an idea of the types of cases used in the sample.  
Consistent with the short-term results on the sample portfolios, the most negative impact has been 
induced by news related to corporate governance and the most positive impact was caused by social 
news.  
Even though most radical cases were intended to be screened out from the sample, it can be 
observed that the number one top and bottom cases represent unusually strong abnormal returns. In 
order to test their impact on the total results, calculations were made also without the number 1 top 
and bottom cases (Capgemini and Royal Ahold). This, however, did not alter the results 
significantly (short-term effect still significantly negative). As explained earlier, no adjustments for 
irrelevant events have been made to the statistical analysis and the models used in this study and 
thus the adequacy of the data relies on the initial screening process. The decision to do so relies on 
the findings of Thompson (1988) that the impact of irrelevant events in the study is marginal.  
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6.2 Long-term 
6.2.1 Results from the Buy-and-Hold approach  
Figure 11: Long-horizon (12, 24, 36 months) BHARs relative to matched firms  
 
See table 11 for more specific information.  
BHAR approach was taken to evaluate whether the sample portfolios earned abnormal returns over 
the post-event time horizons under analysis, and to measure the investors‟ actual experience. Figure 
11 illustrates the long-horizon buy-and hold returns after the event on the six different portfolios for 
three different holding periods (12, 24, 36 months). The abnormal returns have been calculated 
using the matched control samples as the reference portfolios.  
All buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) have been positive which indicates that the stock 
performance has recovered from the initial plunge after the event. This could be interpreted as the 
market not punishing the companies for unethical actions in the long-run. On the contrary, it would 
seem that positive abnormal returns as high as approximately 30% are available for long-term 
investors. 
However, based on the buy-and-hold returns, the exploitable buy-and-hold abnormal returns after 
an ESG event have changed over the years (1998-2002 vs. 2003-2007). The BHARs for 12- and 24-
months have become significantly smaller more recently. On the contrary, the 36-month returns 
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have become larger. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that with event studies, the more time 
passes after the event, the more difficult it is to allocate changes in returns to the event due to the 
increasing noise. Therefore, one should be prudent in drawing conclusion from 36-month BHARs.  
Overall, the BHARs increase as the holding period becomes longer, but this is not consistently the 
case when analyzing subsample portfolio returns separately. It is also visible from the figure 11 that 
the 36-month BHAR is the highest for social news portfolio (30.62%) and lowest for environmental 
news portfolio (16.64%).  
Table 11: Specification of buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured with the matched 
portfolio 
This table summarizes the results from the buy-and-hold approach to estimating long horizon (12, 
24, and 36 months) buy-and hold abnormal returns using the matched firm control sample. 
Specification of buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured with the matched firms 
 1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
12 months 
Average 8.97 % 18.74 % 1.99 % 14.90 % 1.33 % 12.96 % 
StDev 0.407 0.414 0.389 0.394 0.285 0.505 
tsa value 2.426 3.908 0.397 2.265 0.288 1.721 
Significance ** *** - ** - - 
24 months 
Average 14.10 % 23.80 % 7.16 % 10.58 % 9.96 % 20.59 % 
StDev 0.628 0.564 0.665 0.640 0.454 0.767 
 tsa value 2.534 3.459 0.903 0.916 1.393 1.909 
Significance ** *** - - - * 
36 months 
Average 24.94 % 18.92 % 29.24 % 16.64 % 30.62 % 24.48 % 
StDev 1.022 0.934 1.085 1.172 0.864 1.086 
tsa value 2.695 1.307 2.448 0.693 2.574 1.621 
Significance *** - ** - ** - 
Notes: 2-tailed t-test: the rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 90% level is denoted as *, 95% significance level 
is denoted as **, and the rejection at 99% significance level is denoted as ***.  Acceptance of H0 is denoted as - .  
tsa refers to skewness adjusted t value. One month is assumed to equal 21 working days.  
Table 11 depicts the results of the statistical analysis of the long-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns defined by the reference portfolios of matched control sample. For all samples, the 12-, 24-, 
36-month BHARs have been positive, which is interesting considering the significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal returns of the short-term event window. For the total 10-year sample all 
BHARs are significantly positive (8.97%, 14.1%, 24.94%), but the statistical significance of results 
for the subsamples varies.  
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It was observable already form Figure 10 that the 36-month BHAR was highest for social and 
lowest for environmental news samples. Furthermore, as t-values in table 11 suggest, the most 
significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns for environmental sample are gained when the portfolio 
is held for 12-months only, while for the social portfolio the largest abnormal returns are obtained 
by holding the portfolio for 36 months.  
Similarly, for the portfolio 1998-2002, holding the portfolio just for 12-months was enough to earn 
significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns. On the contrary, for sample 2003-2007, investors would 
need to hold the portfolio for 36-months before earning significant BHARs. 
6.2.2 The results from the Calendar-Time Portfolio approach 
Figure 12: Mean Monthly Abnormal Returns on time period portfolios relative to the 
matched firm portfolios using the calendar-time approach 
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Figure 13: Mean Monthly Abnormal Returns on news category portfolios relative to the 
matched firm portfolios using the calendar-time approach 
 
The calendar-time portfolio approach to analyzing long-term abnormal results was taken to study 
whether the sample portfolios persistently earn abnormal monthly returns after an ESG event. 
Figures 12 and 13 plot the Mean Monthly Abnormal Returns (MAR) relative to the matched 
portfolios using the calendar-time approach for each of the 36 months and for each portfolio. The 
mean abnormal return has been calculated for each month as the mean monthly return of the 
companies included in the sample in question for the n
th 
month after the event. Thus, the returns 
illustrated in the graphs are not cumulative. 
Despite of a few peaks, the mean monthly abnormal returns range between ±4% in a random 
zigzag-manner. There are two visible peaks for the MAR of environmental portfolio in Figure 12: 
In month 22 (~ -6%) and in month 32 and 33 (~ +6%). MAR of the governance portfolio peaks at ~ 
+4.5% in month 29. Nevertheless, the peaks are not alarmingly high and no clear patterns in 
behavior of mean monthly abnormal returns are observable from the figures.  
Mean monthly abnormal returns were clearly present in every 36 months after the ESG news 
publication. Analysis of the significance of the grand mean monthly return for the three different 
length periods (12, 24, 36 months) was conducted in the form of t tests and the results are reported 
in Table 10 (next page).  
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Table 12: Specification of Monthly Calendar-Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns relative to the 
matched portfolio 
The analysis in this table is based on the results from the calendar-time portfolio approach to 
estimating long horizon (12, 24, and 36 months) abnormal returns using reference portfolios 
compiled of the matched control sample.  
Specification of Monthly Calendar-Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns 
 relative to the matched portfolio  
 1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
12 months 
MMAR 0.28 % 0.17 % 0.03 % 0.56 % -0.24 % 0.62 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.019 
t value 0.915 0.659 0.068 1.101 -0.466 1.101 
Significance - - - - - - 
24 months 
MMAR 0.24 % 0.10 % 0.10 % -0.04 % 0.24 % 0.42 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.021 0.019 0.022 
t value 1.004 0.520 0.361 -0.083 0.627 0.937 
Significance - - - - - - 
36 months 
MMAR 0.21 % -0.21 % 0.33 % -0.16 % 0.37 % 0.27 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.024 0.016 0.022 
t value 1.057 -1.153 1.390 -0.395 1.368 0.747 
Significance - - - - - - 
Notes: 2-tailed t-test:  the rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 90% level is denoted as *, 95% significance level 
is denoted as **, and the rejection at 99% significance level is denoted as ***.  Acceptance of the H0 is denoted as - . 
One month is assumed to equal 21 working days.  
 
Based on the t tests conducted on the mean monthly abnormal returns calculated using the monthly 
calendar-time portfolio approach and the matched sample as the reference portfolio, the sample 
portfolios do not persistently earn post-event abnormal monthly returns. As can be seen from the 
table 12, all t-values are insignificant.  
For the 12-month holding period, all abnormal returns were, on average, positive, for all samples 
but social. The mean monthly abnormal return from 12 month period for social sample portfolio 
was -0.24%, but turns positive when estimated from the longer period of 24 or 36 months. 
Conversely, for the environmental news sample portfolio, the mean monthly abnormal return turns 
negative when estimated for 24- and 36-month periods.  
55 
7. Robustness checks 
7.1 Short-term study with longer estimation window 
In order to test the influence of estimation window length to the results, the short-term regression 
analysis was conducted also by using an estimation window of 200 days instead of 120 days in 
estimating the market model. The daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are reported in Table 14 on the next page. Table 13 below depicts the portfolio specific 
cumulative abnormal returns and their statistical analysis.  
Table 13: Statistical analysis of short term abnormal returns (estimation window of 200 days) 
The table depicts the cumulative abnormal returns over the 11-day event period and their 
corresponding variances, standard deviations and z-values as well as the statistical significances of 
z-values.  
Statistical analysis of abnormal returns 
Portfolio CAR VAR(CAR) StDev(CAR) Z-value Significance 
2001-2007 
-2.95 % 0.0001 0.010 -3.029 *** 
2001-2004 
-1.87 % 0.0001 0.009 -2.116 ** 
2005-2007 
-4.00 % 0.0001 0.011 -3.574 *** 
Environmental 
-4.28 % 0.0002 0.014 -3.042 *** 
Social 
0.66 % 0.0000 0.004 1.480 - 
Governance 
-5.24 % 0.0003 0.017 -3.176 *** 
Notes: The rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 95% significance level is denoted as **, and the rejection at 
99% significance level is denoted as ***. Estimation window of 200 days was used to estimate the market model. 
In comparison, the results obtained by using a longer estimation window versus shorter window are 
very similar. The daily ARs and CARs are slightly lower with longer estimation window: For 
example for total sample CAR fell from -3.13% to -2.95%. However, the only notable difference is 
observable for the social-portfolio: CAR fell from +1.1% to +0.66% and went from statistically 
significant (95% level) to insignificant. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the overall 
conclusions and implications are independent of the estimation window‟s length. 
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Table 14: Cumulative abnormal returns on the six portfolios for the ±5 day event period (estimation window of 200 days) 
The table depicts the abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the event period on all six portfolios (that illustrate the 
average subsample returns) defined by the short term OLS regression. Day 0 denotes the day the news article was published.  
AR and CAR on portfolios over event period 
 2001-2007 2001-2004 2005-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
Event day AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
-5 0.424 % 0.424 % 0.759 % 0.759 % 0.124 % 0.124 % 0.473 % 0.473 % 0.198 % 0.198 % 0.602 % 0.602 % 
-4 
-2.308 % -1.883 % -1.770 % -1.010 % -2.789 % -2.665 % -3.924 % -3.451 % -0.193 % 0.004 % -2.806 % -2.204 % 
-3 
-0.216 % -2.100 % -0.028 % -1.038 % -0.370 % -3.035 % -0.372 % -3.822 % 0.374 % 0.378 % -0.652 % -2.856 % 
-2 
-0.465 % -2.565 % -0.975 % -2.013 % 0.113 % -2.922 % -0.011 % -3.833 % -0.505 % -0.127 % -0.879 % -3.735 % 
-1 
-0.116 % -2.681 % 0.050 % -1.963 % -0.311 % -3.233 % -0.837 % -4.670 % -0.201 % -0.327 % 0.689 % -3.046 % 
0 
-0.293 % -2.974 % -0.493 % -2.456 % -0.110 % -3.343 % 0.316 % -4.354 % -0.087 % -0.414 % -1.108 % -4.154 % 
1 
0.162 % -2.812 % 0.418 % -2.038 % -0.109 % -3.453 % 0.204 % -4.150 % 0.421 % 0.007 % -0.139 % -4.293 % 
2 
-0.031 % -2.843 % -0.080 % -2.118 % 0.017 % -3.436 % -0.100 % -4.250 % 0.218 % 0.225 % -0.211 % -4.503 % 
3 
0.490 % -2.353 % 0.850 % -1.268 % 0.029 % -3.407 % 0.426 % -3.823 % 0.733 % 0.957 % 0.310 % -4.194 % 
4 
-0.419 % -2.772 % -0.281 % -1.548 % -0.553 % -3.959 % -0.209 % -4.033 % -0.168 % 0.790 % -0.879 % -5.072 % 
5 
-0.182 % -2.954 % -0.322 % -1.871 % -0.039 % -3.998 % -0.250 % -4.283 % -0.127 % 0.662 % -0.169 % -5.241 % 
Notes: The abnormal returns have been defined by using the market model OLS regression with 200-day estimation period. 
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7.2 White-test for heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity may bias the results in the event study. When using the ordinary least squares 
technique, one of the assumptions is that the error term has a constant variance. However, with time 
series data, the error terms often have different variables. Heteroscedasticity can lead to 
underestimation of the variance of the coefficients and, thus, standard errors. With heteroscedastic 
data, the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent but it is not the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) of the Gauss-Markov theorem (Dougherty, 2007). It can still describe the relationship 
between the variables well, but cannot reliably estimate the statistical significance of the 
relationship. The use of the log of the data lessens heteroscedasticity. As a robustness check, the 
White‟s test is used to detect heteroscedasticity by calculating the White‟s Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent Standard Errors. (Ogunc and Hill, 2008) 
                         
                       (17) 
If the standard errors estimated by the OLS regression are different from the White‟s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, there is heteroscedasticity present and the t statistics 
and confidence interval are biased. The table below reports the standard errors for each regression 
of sample portfolios and the market index and the estimated White‟s standard errors. 
Table 15: Standard errors for each regression of samples and the market index estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and by White test 
Comparison of standard errors estimated with OLS and White 
 1998-2007 2001-2004 2005-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
StDev by OLS 0.1513 0.1511 0.1616 0.1473 0.1553 0.1683 
StDev by White 0.1464 0.1529 0.1616 0.1454 0.1728 0.1662 
Heteroscedasticity * * - * * * 
Notes: When the standard errors are not equal, heteroscedasticity is present, which is denoted by *. 
 
 
 
As can be observed from Table 15, there is a slight heteroscedasticity problem with all but 2005-
2007 sample. This might indicate that instead of the standard OLS regression, the Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) regression could be more efficient (see 7.4). Due to the very small differences in 
standard deviations, I would conclude that heteroscedasticity would not appear to be a serious 
problem in this study. 
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7.3 Durbin-Watson statistic to measure autocorrelation 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis uses time series data and it is assumed that 
the error terms are uncorrelated. Nevertheless, it is common that with time series data 
autocorrelation of error terms exists and can bias the results. Autocorrelation refers to the 
correlation of a time series with its own past and future values. This would imply that a time series 
is predictable. The problem arises, when the disturbance terms are autocorrelated. Since standard 
regression model includes the assumption of independent disturbance terms between observations 
this could lead to biased results. Positive autocorrelation, for example, would lead to 
underestimation of the standard errors and the t-values will be biased upwards. The variance of the 
error term would also be underestimated so that R squared will be exaggerated. Therefore, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic was constructed to test for autocorrelation. Typically, the tabulated bounds 
for the critical values of DW-statistic are used to test the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation against 
the alternative of positive first-order autocorrelation, since positive autocorrelation is much more 
common than negative autocorrelation. Thus, the hypothesis tested is H0: ρ=0 versus the alternative 
H1: ρ>0, where ρ denotes the sample autocorrelation of the residuals. The Durbin-Watson test 
statistic is approximately equal to 2(1-ρ) and is defined as: 
               
          
      
 
       (18) 
Thus, d = 2 indicates no autocorrelation. The value of Durbin-Watson statistic always lies between 
0 and 4. If the DW-statistic is substantially less than 2, there is evidence of positive serial 
correlation. However, if Durbin–Watson is less than 1.0, there may be cause for alarm, because 
small values of DW-statistic indicate successive error terms are close in value to one another, or 
positively correlated. Correspondingly, if the DW-statistic (d) is greater than 2, successive error 
terms are much different in value to one another, which imply they are negatively correlated. In 
regressions with time series data this can imply an underestimation of the level of statistical 
significance.  
A complication with interpreting the DW-statistic is that the probability distribution of d depends 
on the data matrix X. Thus, it is not possible to tabulate critical values that can be applied to all 
models. Instead, upper and lower bounds for the critical values have been established. At 99% 
significance level the critical range of d is 1.611-1.637 and in 95% significance level, the range is 
1.654-1.694. Table 16 reports the Durbin-Watson statistics for the six samples.  
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Table 16: Durbin-Watson statistics for each sample to test autocorrelation of error terms 
Durbin-Watson statistics for detecting autocorrelation 
 1998-07 2001-04 2005-07 Environmental Social Governance 
Durbin-Watson 2.31 2.16 2.33 2.46 2.12 2.07 
Positive autocorrelation - - - - - - 
Notes: - denotes acceptance of H0: ρ=0 versus H1: ρ>0 at 99% significance level.  
 
 
 
As the DW-statistics convey, there is no positive autocorrelation of error terms in the time series 
data used. Therefore, the results obtained by the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) are not 
biased by autocorrelation and the assumption of uncorrelated error terms is justified. 
7.4 General Least Squares (GLS) regressions 
Since the OLS regression is inefficient in heteroscedastic models, and there was slight 
heteroscedasticity present in the model estimated in this study, I used also the Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) regression, which is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). The GLS estimator 
works by transforming the model into a homoscedastic one and applying OLS to the transformed 
model. By dividing all observations by the square root of xi, the model will transform from 
heteroscedastic into homoscedastic and a new model with correct t-statistics can be estimated using 
the least squares regression. (Ogunc and Hill, 2008) 
The market model estimated with GLS was then used to determine the event period abnormal 
returns. The cumulative abnormal returns and their statistical analysis are reported in table 17.  
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Table 17: Statistical analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) determined by model 
estimated with GLS regression 
Statistical analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) determined using GLS regression 
Portfolio CAR VAR(CAR) StDev(CAR) Z-value Significance 
2001-2007 -1.29 % 0.0000 0.0054 -2.3875 ** 
2001-2004 -2.23 % 0.0001 0.0092 -2.4071 ** 
2005-2007 -1.16 % 0.0000 0.0043 -2.7160 *** 
Environmental -3.37 % 0.0001 0.0100 -3.3788 *** 
Social 1.27 % 0.0000 0.0050 2.5245 ** 
Governance -5.69 % 0.0003 0.0172 -3.3039 *** 
Notes: The rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 95% significance level is denoted as **, and the rejection at 
99% significance level is denoted as ***. Estimation window of 120 days was used to estimate the market model. 
The results obtained by GLS regression are very similar to those estimated with the OLS 
regressions: The event period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are significantly negative for all 
portfolios but the social sample, which is significantly positive. The CARs are slightly smaller 
calculated by the model estimated with GLS, but the direction of the reaction is the same and all 
abnormal returns are statistically significant. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the short-term 
analysis hold. 
7.5 Long-term study with MSCI sector indices as the alternative reference portfolio 
A possible source of error in the long-term study is the benchmark used to estimate abnormal 
returns. As explained earlier, while using indices is a popular choice; it is not optimal for long-term 
event studies due to several biases. I used a matched firm control sample as the reference portfolio, 
which method has proven to solve many of the problems related to the use of indices. However, it is 
undeniable that the actual formation of the matched sample is subjective to certain extent. Therefore, 
as a sanity and robustness check, all long-term calculations were conducted using the alternative 
reference portfolio compiled of MSCI Sector Indices as well. 
Comparative analysis of the results is likely to lead to more credible conclusions, even though 
results from the use of the matched control sample will be emphasized. It should be kept in mind 
that differences between results obtained using different benchmarks are to be expected as the two 
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differently formed reference portfolios suffer from different limitations. In this section I will present 
the results from buy-and-hold abnormal return approach and calendar-time approach using the 
index reference portfolio as a benchmark.  
7.5.1 Buy-and-Hold approach 
Figure 14: Long-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns (with index reference portfolio) 
 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns in figure 14 have been calculated relative to the reference 
portfolio that consists of corresponding sector indices. Compared to the BHARs calculated with the 
matched sample portfolio the figure draws a similar picture for the total sample: Significantly 
positive for all holding periods. There are portfolio specific differences, however, especially in the 
3-year BHARs between the results. This mainly underlines the difficulty of measuring long-term 
abnormal returns and the great dependence of the results on the reference portfolio. Especially the 
use of indices lowers the reliability of the 36-month BHARs because of the new listing or survivor 
bias, the rebalancing bias, and the cross correlation that tend to increase with longer time horizon.  
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Table 18: Specification of buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured with MSCI Sector 
Indices 
This table summarizes the results from the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach to 
estimating long horizon (12, 24, and 36 months) abnormal returns using reference portfolios 
compiled of MSCI Sector Indices. 
Specification of buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured with MSCI Sector Indices 
 1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
  12 months 
Average 5.82 % 17.71 % -2.68 % 17.42 % -1.16 % 5.59 % 
StDev 0.371 0.408 0.318 0.466 0.244 0.396 
tsa value 1.909 4.613 -0.696 2.902 -0.329 0.992 
Significance * *** - *** - - 
24 months 
Average 18.22 % 28.98 % 10.54 % 30.33 % 9.30 % 19.55 % 
StDev 0.535 0.547 0.516 0.605 0.419 0.580 
tsa value 4.468 4.850 1.952 3.508 1.544 2.862 
Significance *** *** * *** - *** 
36 months 
Average 29.53 % 28.67 % 30.14 % 50.42 % 18.05 % 28.08 % 
StDev 0.721 0.610 0.796 0.879 0.663 0.651 
tsa value 5.393 4.106 3.866 4.697 1.858 3.370 
Significance *** ** *** *** * *** 
Notes: 2-tailed t-test: the rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 90% level is denoted as *, 95% significance level 
is denoted as **, and the rejection at 99% significance level is denoted as ***.  Acceptance of H0 is denoted as - .  
tsa refers to skewness adjusted t value. One month is assumed to equal 21 working days.  
Overall, the range of BHARs defined by the indices is wider: Minimum -2.68% (12-month BHAR 
for 2003-2007) to maximum +50.42% (36-month BHAR for environmental sample). Corresponding 
minimum and maximum BHARs with matched control sample are 1.33% and 30.62% (12- and 36-
month BHAR for social sample). The biggest difference between the results relates to the 
environmental sample portfolio. The results obtained with matched control sample, suggested the 
most significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns for environmental sample are gained when the 
portfolio is held for only 12-months. However, relative to index reference portfolio, it would seem 
beneficial to hold the portfolio for 36 months as BHAR for 36 months is the highest and most 
significant.  
From the earlier results (matched sample reference portfolio) was concluded that in order to benefit 
from the ESG event in for of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, investors need to hold their portfolio 
longer now than in the beginning of the decade. This conclusion can also be drawn from these 
results (index reference portfolio).  
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7.5.2 Calendar-time portfolio approach  
Figure 15: Mean Monthly Abnormal Returns on time period portfolios relative to matched 
index portfolios using the calendar-time approach 
 
Figure 16: Mean Monthly Abnormal Returns on news category portfolios relative to matched 
index portfolios using the calendar-time approach 
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Table 19: Specification of Monthly Calendar-Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns relative to 
MSCI Indices 
The analysis in this table is based on the results from the calendar-time portfolio approach to 
estimating long horizon (12, 24, and 36 months) abnormal returns using reference portfolios 
compiled of MSCI Sector Indices. 
Specification of Monthly Calendar-Time Portfolio Abnormal Returns 
 relative to MSCI Indices 
 1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007 Environmental Social Governance 
12 months 
MMAR -0.06 % 0.30 % -0.29 % 0.81 % -0.58 % -0.11 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.014 
t value -0.392 1.122 -1.012 2.411 -2.713 -0.291 
Significance - - - ** * - 
24 months 
MMAR 0.27 % 0.34 % 0.09 % 0.54 % 0.04 % 0.31 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.015 
t value 1.716 2.075 0.347 1.676 0.160 1.010 
Significance * ** - - - - 
36 months 
MMAR 0.19 % 0.18 % 0.18 % 0.41 % 0.04 % 0.17 % 
var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StDev 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.022 0.011 0.014 
t value 1.440 1.181 0.859 1.113 0.222 0.696 
Significance - - - - - - 
Notes: 2-tailed t-test:  the rejection of the H0: abnormal returns = 0 at 90% level is denoted as *, 95% significance level 
is denoted as **, and the rejection at 99% significance level is denoted as ***.  Acceptance of the H0 is denoted as - . 
One month is assumed to equal 21 working days. 
Based on the t tests conducted on the mean monthly abnormal returns calculated using the monthly 
calendar-time portfolio approach and the matched MSCI Sector Indices as the reference portfolio, 
the sample portfolios do not persistently earn post-event abnormal monthly returns. As can be seen 
from the table 19, most t-values are insignificant. Even though some t values suggest significant 
mean monthly return, the evidence is quite random and contradictory to results gained with the 
matched portfolio as reference and therefore not convincing enough to claim persistent post-event 
abnormal returns.  
The table 19 above illustrates the results from the statistical analysis of the mean monthly abnormal 
returns calculated using the monthly calendar-time portfolio approach and the reference portfolio 
made of MSCI Sector Indices. The t-values are notably higher and more often statistically 
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significant compared to the results for MMAR estimated with the matched portfolio. The main 
reason for this is that the standard deviation of MMARs are notably lower when they are calculated 
using the index portfolios, which directly affects the t-values. This observation could be 
approximated also from comparing the figures 12-13 and 15-16. 
Consistent with earlier results with matched sample as the benchmark, the peaks are not alarmingly 
high and no clear patterns in behavior of mean monthly abnormal returns are observable from the 
Figures 14 and 15. 
Overall, the MARs calculated relative to the matched reference portfolio and the index reference 
portfolio appear similar. On average, the range of the zigzag is narrower, around ±3% (instead of 
±4%) and the largest peak (environmental portfolio MAR in month 32) is about the same (~ +6%). 
However, on an individual portfolio MAR level, the direction of the abnormal return for a specific 
month is in some cases the opposite or the MAR is significantly smaller. For example, the MAR for 
environmental portfolio in month 22 is about -6% when calculated relative to the matched portfolio, 
but is only approximately -2% when compared to the index reference portfolio. 
In general, the results from long-term study using indices as benchmarks largely supported 
conclusions drawn from the results from long-term analysis using matched sample portfolio.  In 
cases where the results significantly differ depending on which reference portfolio is used, it is 
assumed that the true market reaction lies somewhere in the middle ground. As discussed, both 
reference portfolios suffer from limitations (different from one another) that can bias the results. It 
is possible that the two sets of results reflect opposite extremes. Nevertheless, like earlier studies 
suggests, I will emphasizes results from using the matched control portfolio. 
7.6 Filtering event data 
The adequacy of the event data is mainly based on the initial screening process of the events. 
However, a second screening was done after the first calculations. In some cases, the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) deviated so radically from the mean that there was reason to suspect 
either the ESG-news event had not been the sole factor inducing abnormal returns or the impact of 
the news had been so extreme that including the case in the sample would jeopardize the 
universality of the results. All cases with a standard deviation of ±5 or higher/lower from the sample 
mean BHAR were excluded from the sample and the calculation were rerun with the smaller sample. 
The original sample of 150 cases decreased to 123 after all screens. 
66 
When examined the short term abnormal returns individually, the most extreme cases were 
observed to deviate dramatically despite of the screening. As a robustness check, the regressions 
and statistical tests were rerun without the most extreme cases, but the results did not change 
significantly. 
8 Analysis 
The two research problems for this study were: 
1. How do negative ESG-news affect companies‟ stock returns in the short- and long-run? 
2. Has the market reaction to negative ESG-news changed over time? 
In this section, I will analyze the empirical results and their implications and explanations with the 
purpose of answering the two research problems. The analysis has been divided into three sections 
to examine the three hypotheses of this study separately and how the empirical evidence either 
supported or objected to them. I will also discuss probable explanatory factors and scenarios for the 
specific market reactions.  
8.1 Short-term market reaction 
H1: Negative ESG related company specific news article induces a significant negative stock price 
reaction in the short-term. 
8.1.1 Overall short-term impact of ESG-news 
The empirical results from the regression analysis of short-term abnormal returns showed that 
markets react negatively to negative ESG-event reportages. The news induced significant (at 99% 
level) negative cumulative abnormal returns (of -3.129% by OLS with 120-day estimation window, 
-2.954% by OLS with 200-day estimation window, and -1.29% by GLS with 120-day estimation 
window). Therefore, the hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted. 
Even though previous studies had shown conflicting empirical evidence, the evidence from this 
study is straightforward regarding the significance of abnormal return induced by the ESG incident 
reportage. The initial market reaction was negative and significant across all samples.  
Based on the ±5 day abnormal returns, it‟s apparent that the initial market reaction took place 
already on day -4. The abnormal return on day -4 for the total sample portfolio was -2.313 %. Based 
on this phenomenon, it could be argued that print media is old news. The information was had 
already reached the market, on average, 4 days before the Financial Times published the news. 
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Since it is the job of professional investors to know what‟s going on in the companies they are 
investing into and to anticipate the markets‟ reaction, they are actively seeking information. 
Different professional databases and news channels, such as Reuters and Bloomberg, ensure that the 
investors are not depended on printed media for information. Naturally TV and the Internet enable 
also less professional investors to receive information more quickly than by waiting for the morning 
paper.  
After the initial plunge, all portfolios experienced a partial recovery. One explanation could be an 
increased demand of the stock, which could be considered as undervalued after the overreaction on 
day -4. Another could be increased information, which eases the uncertainty. On the day +4, all 
portfolios faced a second drop in returns. On average, the abnormal return fell 0.797 % points to the 
level of -0.453 % of abnormal return. This collective plunge could suggest that again, more 
information had been published about the incident, its severity, and the likely implications to the 
firm and/or its shareholders have become clearer. The fall in returns could imply that this 
complementary information is even more negative than the market was expecting at that point. 
The analysis of ±5 event window abnormal returns revealed, in addition to the negative initial 
market reaction, the increased uncertainty due to the event. Despite of the apparently quick recovery 
from the initial shock, a zigzag movement of abnormal returns during the eight days after the initial 
reaction reflects this uncertainty. Most likely, this is also a period of reassessment of values, 
priorities, and investment strategies for the current shareholders and potential shareholders, which 
would externalize as random up and down movement in abnormal returns. 
8.1.2. Short-term reaction to reportage of environmental violations 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the environmental portfolio were significantly negative (CAR: 
-4.952 %) and the initial abnormal return on day -4 (AR: -3.864 %) was the second most dramatic 
compared to the other sample portfolios. The hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted. 
This result is consistent with for example Tommy Lundgren and Rickard Olson‟s short-term event 
study results on environmental incidents. They discovered that, in Europe, negative events are 
generally associated with negative returns. Lundgren and Olson estimated the average initial 
abnormal return to be -1.6 %, which is slightly lower than the results of this study, but nevertheless 
statistically significant. 
According to Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005), the losses in market value (two-day stock price 
reaction of -1.69%) correspond to the legal penalties followed the environmental violations. 
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However, the legal penalties are unlikely to explain the whole market reaction in this study, as the 
market reactions to the initial announcement of the events were studied, at which time the legal 
penalties are yet unknown. It is true that financial consequences from environmental violation can 
be severe and it is possible that part of the market reaction is due to an expected fine that will likely 
be imposed sometime in the future. The investors may be anticipating plausible legal penalties, but 
it‟s unlikely the change in stock returns at the time of the initial announcement would exactly 
correspond to the legal penalties that realize months or years later. Therefore, I conclude that there 
are nontrivial reputational penalties involved in the market reaction. 
8.1.3 Short-term reaction to reportage of socially irresponsible behavior  
In contrast to the results on the other sample portfolios, the social portfolio faced significantly 
positive cumulative abnormal returns (+1.10 %), despite of the initial negative abnormal return of -
0.19 %. The hypothesis 1 (H1) is inconclusive. 
As opposed to environmental and governance violations, negative social incidents don‟t necessarily 
break laws. Mass-layoffs, poor working conditions, or low wage-levels that might lead to e.g. 
strikes, might not violate any local government regulations and might not as such induce any 
penalties. Even though large strikes are often expensive especially for manufacturing companies, 
the savings achieved from closing down production facilities due to overcapacity can, and often do, 
overcome these costs. Assuming investors understand this, it could explain why even the short-term 
abnormal returns can be positive.  
Company restructures, adjustments to production capacity, and developing operations are often not 
just profitable but also vitally important for the company. When the management makes decisions 
of this kind, which lead to unpopular changes and layoffs, it can serve as a sign of the 
management‟s a competence. Chen, Mehrotha, Sivakumar, and Yu (2001) studied layoffs and 
achieved similar results to this study. They found that despite of the initial two-day -1.2% abnormal 
return, in the long-term the performance of the company improves. As 47% of the social-category‟s 
news are about mass-layoffs, this phenomenon is likely to affect the results of this subsample. 
The sample included also news about allegations of a corporate wrongdoing against an individual 
employee. It is quite rare for an individual to rise against a large corporation to defend his/her rights, 
and even when they do, the economic consequences from the company‟s point of view are often 
insignificant even if s/he would win the case. Based the empirical results of this study, reportage of 
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negative incidents influencing a person or a society is not considered important or significant 
enough to affect the stock returns negatively.  
8.1.4 Short-term reaction to reportage of corporate governance crime 
Reportage of corporate governance violations induced the most dramatic short-term abnormal 
returns. The initial AR was -2.9% and the 11-day CAR was -5.5%. The hypothesis 1 (H1) is 
accepted. 
This result is compatible with Bauer and Brown‟s (2005) findings. They measured a ±5 day 
cumulative abnormal return of -4.33 % after an allegation of corporate fraud. Also Bauer and 
Brown discovered a significant drop in share price right before announcement, which implies 
rumors hit the market before the official news.  
Similar to environmental violations, corporate governance violations can lead to severe legal 
penalties and it is likely that some of the market‟s reaction to the news is attributable to that. If the 
duty of care is violated, shareholders can initiate lawsuits. In addition, violating governance 
regulation can lead to a loss of trust toward the management. In their study, Marciukaityte et al. 
(2006) found that after being accused of corporate fraud, often leads to changes in the company‟s 
board of directors. Changing the board of directors is aimed to reinstate the investors‟ confidence in 
the company.   
Karpoff et al. (2005) argued that reputational penalties are higher for corporate governance 
violations, because environmental violations rarely harm directly the company‟s customers, 
employees or suppliers. This theory is consistent with the results of this study as the governance 
news had a greater negative impact than the environmental news.   
Corporate governance crimes include also e.g. accounting frauds, which could mean that the 
financial information published about the company has been inaccurate or plain false. The price 
reaction can thus reflect the uncertainty of the company‟s actual economic health and future 
prospects (based on financial information). Historically, many companies that have committed 
accounting fraud have gone bankrupt after being caught. I have excluded the companies that have 
gone bankrupt soon (within three years) of being accused of governance crime, so that the impact 
on stock returns measured in this study is not biased by the falling stock prices of companies going 
under. 
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8.2 Long-term market reaction 
It is not intuitive to whether market should react positively or negatively in the longer-term to 
negative ESG-events. In this chapter I will recap the long-term empirical evidence and determine 
whether or not hypothesis 2a and 2b are accepted or rejected in regard to long-horizon buy-and-hold 
returns and monthly mean abnormal returns. 
H2a: The price effect of the ESG news article is significant and negative in the long-term. 
H2b: The price effect of the ESG news article is significant and positive in the long-term. 
8.2.1 Evidence from post-event buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
8.2.1.1 Overall long-term impact of ESG-news and possible explanations 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns were estimated for post-event holding periods of 12, 24, and 36 
months to measure the investor‟s actual experience after an ESG- event has been reported in a 
newspaper. Based on the total sample of 123 cases, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for horizons 
12-, 24-, and 36-months are positive (8.97%, 14.10%, 24.94% respectively) and statistically 
significant (at 95% or 99% level). Since the long-term effects were not negative for any of the 
samples, it can be stated that the hypothesis 2a (H2a) can be rejected and hypothesis 2b (H2b) 
accepted.  
The result of positive long-term buy-and-hold returns on stock of companies that have acted 
irresponsibly is in line with the results of long-term study of Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006). 
They studied the 1,2 and 3-year stock returns and found that companies scoring highly on ethical 
criteria represent poor investments and that there are considerable abnormal returns available from 
holding a portfolio of socially least desirable stocks.  
Brammer et al. (2006) suggest considering behavioral explanations in addition to standard risk-
based models. It is possible that an altruistic private or institutional shareholder is willing to give up 
returns in exchange for a clear conscience. This would lead to required returns being lower for those 
firms. Also, the actual costs of being responsible (and earning a high CSR score) affect the bottom 
line of the company negatively. If the shareholders fail to account for this, the companies that 
engage excessively in CSR activities will be punished by the market in the form of lower share 
price. (Brammer et al. 2006)  
In their paper, Kaustia, Laukkanen, and Puttonen (2009) remind that the conventional asset pricing 
model would oppose to the idea that ethically responsible companies should provide superior 
71 
returns. As discussed in chapter 2.2, any good characteristic priced by the market is associated with 
lower instead of higher return expectations, because a good rating in the characteristic causes a 
decrease in the required return. Lower required return would lead to a higher current stock price and 
a lower future return on average (Kaustia et al. 2009). However, in order for the market to price the 
stock correctly, the investors are assumed to be aware of whether or not the company is ethically 
responsible. If the news about an ESG crime is indeed news to the market, it would be expected for 
the price to be corrected according to the new status of “irresponsible” company. 
So a possible explanation for positive long-term abnormal returns on a stock of an ethically 
irresponsible company is the aforementioned theory that the unethical behavior is in fact already 
included in the stock prices. However, in reality, the investors cope with imperfect and asymmetric 
information, and it is somewhat unlikely that all companies accused of ESG-violation in the sample 
had been correctly priced in advance.  
One could also appeal to the short memories of investors. It is possible investors simply forget 
about corporate indiscretions of the past.  
“Investors have very short memories.” (Roman Abramovich) 
However, the financial theory doesn‟t support strategies based on short-term memory for longer-
term investors. In his book “Risk Finance and Asset Pricing: Value, Measurements, and Markets”, 
Charles S. Tapiero discusses (among other things) persistence and short- and long-term memory 
models. They differ from the Markov model, which emphasizes the dependence on the current state 
instead of how it came to being. In short-term memory models the probability of stock price 
increasing or decreasing is a function of the current price and the prices assumed in the previous 
cases. According to Tapiero, empirical evidence shows that memory is common in intraday data 
and could be useful in high-frequency trading with trades that are defined by the past change in 
prices over the past minutes.  
Nevertheless, when holding a stock for a longer period of time, investors should consider past 
events as they are likely to affect future events. Long-run memory assesses the probability of 
current events based on long-past events. Tapiero believes there is a strong case for technical 
forecasting on stock prices: If speculative prices exhibit dependency that would be inconsistent with 
rational expectations. According to this logic, it would be irrational for investors to leave out ESG-
events when modeling expected future returns. (Tapiero, 2010) 
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8.2.1.2 Variance in BHARs of different news category samples 
Contrary to the findings of Brammer at al. (2006), there was variation in the buy-and-hold returns 
(BHAR) of different news category samples and different holding periods. Highest 12-month 
BHAR (14.90%) was earned by environmental portfolio, highest 24-month BHAR (20.59%) was 
earned by governance portfolio and the highest 36-month BHAR was earned by social portfolio. 
Social and governance portfolios‟ BHAR increased as the holding period increased, but the 
environmental portfolio‟s 24-month BHAR was lower than its 12-month BHAR. This result might 
be linked to the savings and/or costs and their deferral induced by the events. The high one year 
BHARs and lower two and three year BHARs of the environmental portfolio could be explained by 
the short-term savings from e.g. not disposing of waste properly, and the long-term costs of legal 
penalties that are likely to be realized months after the event because of legal bureaucracy. So 
neglecting environmental regulation could save money in the short term (~ a year), but the sanctions 
from doing so can induce costs on the second or third year. Since it could take over a year before 
the official decision on who is responsible for the environmental violation, there could be a second 
market reaction based on reputational costs taking place when this information is confirmed and 
published.  
Most of the social category‟s events in this study were related to corporate restructuring. The slowly 
increasing BHARs can be explained by the initial costs of e.g. layoffs (golden handshakes) and 
closing down plants, and the gradual savings and performance improvements. The different holding 
period BHARs for governance (12.96%, 20.59%, and 24.48%) suggest that the legal penalties that 
could follow, were imposed on the third year. 
Also the accumulation of BHARs earned by the governance portfolio slows down with the increase 
of the holding period length. As assumed with the other cases, this could imply that the 
consequences of the ESG-violation realize during the third year.  
8.2.2 Evidence from calendar-time mean monthly returns 
With the purpose of discovering whether there is persistence (temporal causality) in the sample 
portfolios‟ abnormal post-event returns, the mean monthly abnormal returns (MMAR) were 
estimated by using the reference portfolios of matched control sample and matched indices. 
All MMARs were statistically insignificant. Thus, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion 
that the sample portfolios do not persistently earn post-event abnormal monthly returns. 
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There was variation in the sign of the MMAR of different portfolios and different lengths of 
estimation period, but most were positive. A few of the MMARs calculated relative to the sector 
index reference portfolio were significant at 90% or 95% level of significance. However, in general, 
the results were trivial.  
Since the buy-and-hold abnormal returns were consistently positive and significant, I conclude that 
the negative ESG event reportage does have a positive long-term effect on returns, but that the 
abnormal returns are not persistent through the post event months. This implies that it is more 
difficult for short-term investors to benefit from the positive effect. 
8.3 Evolution of the market reaction 
Before conducting this empirical study, I hypothesized that the market reaction could have changed 
over time as the attention corporate sustainability and ethical behavior receives has grown 
remarkably during past years. For example, Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim (2010) found 
evidence that socially responsible firms receive more favorable recommendations in recent years 
relative to earlier ones. Their analyst recommendation data and stock market data was collected 
from years 1993-2008. Their findings suggest a changing perception of the value of such strategies 
by the analysts (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). 
H3: The market reaction to ESG related news has changed over time.  
In this section, I will evaluate the short- and long-term results from the perspective of whether or 
not to accept the hypothesis 3 (H3).  
8.3.1 Short-term evidence 
The short-term study was conducted with event study from years 2001-2007 and the sample was 
divided by the date of publication of the article into two samples: 2001-2004 and 2005-2007. The 
short-term cumulative abnormal returns from the event window of 11-days were -2.19% for the 
sample portfolio 2001-2004, and -3.99% for the sample portfolio 2005-2007. The statistical 
significance of the cumulative abnormal returns was significant for both samples at the 99% 
confidence level. Thus the short-term market reaction has clearly become stronger. Also the initial 
market reaction (on day -4) has become stronger and more negative (from -1.821% to -2.736%). 
Therefore, the short-term market reaction has changed over time and the hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
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8.3.2 Long-term evidence 
8.3.2.1Buy-and-Hold returns 
The event data was collected from years 1998-2007, and was divided into two five year samples 
1998-2003 and 2004-2007 in order to evaluate whether a change in market reaction had taken place. 
Therefore, as explained before, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) were measured 
separately for these samples as well.  
The 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns had clearly decreased: From approximately 18.74% 
to 1.99%. Similarly, the 24-month BHAR decreased from 23.80% to 7.16%. However, the 36-
month BHAR had increased from 18.92% to 29.24%. Exactly the same phenomenon was 
observable, when the BHARs were estimated using the sector index portfolios. Clearly a change in 
market reaction has taken place and therefore, hypothesis 3 is accepted.  
Based on the empirical evidence, it would seem that it is more difficult now to earn long-term 
abnormal returns during the first two post-event years as it was before. Nevertheless, investors 
willing to hold the unethical companies in their portfolios for three years have the opportunity to 
earn even higher abnormal returns than in the beginning of the decade.  
8.3.2.2. Calendar-time mean monthly abnormal returns 
For the comparative analysis, also mean monthly abnormal returns (MMARs) were calculated for 
the two five-year samples (news published during 1998-2002 and 2003-2007) to find out whether 
there was a difference related to time.  
The phenomenon observed with BHARS can be observed also when comparing MMARs: The 
MMAR of 12- and 24-months had decreased and the 36-month MMAR had increased. Contrary to 
BHARs, the MMARs were insignificant 1998-2002 and insignificant in 2003-2007. Thus, even 
though a change can be observed in the MMARS it is not statistically significant. Robustness check 
of calculating MMARs with the sector index portfolios support this conclusion. In terms of earning 
persistently abnormal monthly returns after the ESG event, the market reaction has not changed 
over time and hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
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9. Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis was to study and evaluate the public attitude and reactions to reportages 
of environmental, social, and corporate governance related corporate misbehavior as they 
externalize in changes in the investors‟ investing behavior, in other words, in stock returns.  
The main findings of this research suggest that negative ESG-news induce a statistically 
significantly negative market reaction in stock returns in the short-term and a positive in the long-
term. Also, significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns were observed during the three post-event 
years. However, abnormal returns were not persistently present in each month. The news category 
of environmental, social or corporate governance influenced significantly the extent and direction of 
the market reaction.  
The empirical results also suggest a change in market reaction over time. The short-term negative 
reaction has intensified over the years, the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns for holding 
periods of 12- and 24-months have decreased, and the 36-month buy-and-hold returns have 
increased. 
     
The empirical results indicate an initial overreaction by the market and relatively quick recovery. It 
is possible to aim to exploit this phenomenon to earn abnormal returns, but it would very be 
difficult with only few unethical stocks. The results of this study are generalized averages of over a 
hundred cases and are not directly applicable to estimating the outcome of individual cases.  
From the investor‟s perspective, it appears that the most profitable strategy would be to buy the 
undervalued stock right after the initial plunge and hold it in the investment portfolio for at least a 
year, benefiting both from buying at discount and from the buy-and-hold abnormal returns at annual 
level. The ideal holding period depends on the news category. After environmental news, the buy-
and hold abnormal returns are highest with 12 month holding period, and after social and 
governance news, it would appear to be profitable to hold the stock for 36 months.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1: Negative ESG related company specific news article induces a significantly 
negative reaction to stock returns in the short-term. 
H2a: The effect on stock returns of the ESG news article is significantly negative 
in the long-term. 
H2b: The effect on stock returns of the ESG news article is significantly positive 
in the long-term. 
H3: The market reaction to ESG related news has changed over time. 
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The results of this study don‟t encourage remedial actions at strategic or operative level by the 
companies (ceteris paribus). Nevertheless, the findings of intensified negative reaction and 
decreased positive long-term returns over time support the theory of the increased role and 
importance of corporate social responsibility (Lougee and Wallace, 2008). This is likely to impact 
irresponsible companies‟ profitability, and thus CSR should be considered at least in the long-term 
strategy. 
The private and institutional investors, who have limited their investment horizon by excluding 
unethically operating companies, forgo an opportunity to exploit the overreaction of the market to 
ESG-news in exchange for clear conscience. Since this window of opportunity and the potential 
financial benefits are getting slimmer, the cost of responsible investing is decreasing as well.  
10. Suggestions for future research 
CSR has had a slower start in the Asian Emerging Markets compared to developed markets 
(Cheung et al. 2010). Cultural difference as well as the stage of development of the market can 
influence investors‟ objectives, values, and priorities. This motivates a comparative study of market 
reaction to ESG-news between developed markets such as Europe or the Unites States and Asian 
Emerging Markets. 
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11. Appendices  
11.1 Appendix 1: Example ESG news 
11.1.1 Examples of negative environmental-category news articles 
Example 1. 
Headline: Toxic waste spill hits Spanish crops 
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: April 28, 1998, Tuesday 
Company: Boliden AB, OMX Stockholm 
Article:  
“A toxic waste spill from a mine reservoir in southern Spain was killing everything in its path 
yesterday as it moved down rivers and man-made channels to the Gulf of Cadiz, the 
environmentalist group Greenpeace said. 
An estimated 5m cubic meters of waste flooded into the Guadiamar river on Saturday, but was 
then diverted away from the Donana National Park, one of Europe's most prized nature reserves. 
Instead, the tainted water, containing residues of zinc, lead calcium and other metals, was 
flowing into the Guadalquivir River and then out to the Gulf of Cadiz. 
Jim Borland, a spokesman for the Swedish-Canadian group Boliden, which owns the mine, said 
that a sliding layer of ground beneath the reservoir (above) had caused the wall to break. 
Spanish State television said preliminary estimates put crop losses at Pta2bn (£7.8m). "I've lost 
my whole crop, my whole livelihood," a tomato farmer said.”” 
Event period CAR: -2.6% 
Example 2. 
Headline: Authorities in Alaska probe BP site blast 
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: August 24, 2002 Saturday 
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Company: BP Ltd., London Stock Exchange 
Article: 
Alaskan authorities were yesterday investigating an explosion at BP's operation in the state, which 
seriously injured an operator and caused a spill that might jeopardise the terms of the company's 
federal probation with US authorities.  
Ed Meggert, state on-scene coordinator for the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 
said the August 16 blast was only the second such explosion in 10 years at Prudhoe Bay.  
It was being investigated by his organization, the Alaska Department of Occupational Safety and 
Health, fire authorities and BP.  
"This is both a safety problem and a maintenance problem," Mr Meggert said. "We want to know 
what BP should have been doing."  
BP Exploration Alaska pleaded guilty in 1999 to one felony count related to the illegal disposal of 
hazardous waste in Alaska. The company agreed to use "best environmental practices" to protect 
workers, the public and the environment during five years' probation.  
Paul Laird, BP spokesman in Alaska, said Don Shugak was seriously injured when sent to work on 
a well that BP noted was recording "high pressure". A gas leak resulted in a "fire explosion" that 
took six hours to put out by pumping sea water into the well, he said.  
Mr Meggert said about 3,000 gallons of sea water, which is toxic to the Alaskan tundra, had to be 
pumped into the well to shut it off, resulting in what is considered a spill.  
Charles Hamel, an advocate for BP workers in Alaska, raised the incident in a letter with US 
Probation Officer Mary Francis Barnes, BP Probation Monitor Ridgway Hall, and Assistant US 
Attorney Deborah Smith.  
He claimed BP knew the well was experiencing dangerous pressure build-up but it had nonetheless 
been brought back on line.  
"Eagerness to meet oil production goals over-ruled regulations, safety of the personnel, risk to the 
environment and common sense judgment," Mr Hamel said.  
79 
He said BP had "yellow tagged" up to 100 other wells with potential problems that still were 
carrying oil and gas. "We believe BP will be in violation of the probation terms until it shuts down 
and tests every 'yellow tagged' dysfunctional well."  
BP's Mr Laird said the company was investigating whether other wells had similar problems.  
Event period CAR: -10.34 % 
11.1.2 Examples of negative social-category news articles 
Example 1.  
Headline: Finnish paper and pulp industry hit by strike  
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: April 12, 2000, Wednesday 
Author: Nicholas George 
Company: UPM Kymmene Corp, OMX Helsinki 
Article: 
“Finland's paper and pulp industry was brought to a halt by strike action yesterday in the latest 
of a series of industrial disputes to affect the booming Nordic country. 
About 30,000 employees went on strike following the breakdown of talks in which unions and 
employers failed to reach agreement on wages and working hours. 
The action follows similar disputes by chemical and transport workers and is seen partly as an 
indication of the difficulties the country is having in coming to terms with its membership of the 
euro. Finland's economy is forecast to grow by about 5 per cent this year with both the central 
bank and finance ministry warning of signs of overheating. 
This is particularly true in certain industries such as construction and IT where there are labour 
shortages, and in the Helsinki region in general where property prices are soaring. 
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The current wave of strikes has mainly affected the country's export industries that have 
traditionally been able to absorb high wage increases through devaluations, an avenue no longer 
open because of the country's euro membership. 
"If you look back you see that wage rises in Finland have been double those of other European 
countries which made the industry uncompetitive and were followed now and then by 
devaluation. This is not possible anymore," explained Timo Proranen, chairman of the Finnish 
Forrest Industries Federation. 
He said the unions were demanding a pay increase of over 6 per cent as well as cuts in working 
hours. 
The strike will cost the country FM200m (Dollars 32m, Euros 34m) in lost export earnings per 
day with UPM-Kymmene, one of the world's largest forestry groups, estimating the action will 
cost it Euros 50m (Dollars 48m) a week. 
Jaana Aaltonen, of the Paper Workers Union, said the wage rise was in fact between 4-5 per 
cent. "We are prepared for a rather long strike, one or two weeks at the shortest," she said. 
Juha Ahtola, chief economist at Merita bank in Helsinki, was more relaxed about the threat of 
overheating and wage pressures in the overall economy. 
He pointed out that high demands were largely restricted to the export industries. Most employees 
in the domestic sector had already settled for around 3.1 per cent.” 
Event period CAR: -1 % 
Example 2.  
Headline: Casino staff threaten strike 
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: December 31, 2004 Friday 
Author: Martin Arnold 
Company: Groupe Partouche, Euronext Paris 
Article: 
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“The croupier's traditional cry of "rien ne va plus, les jeux sont faits" is more urgent than ever 
today in France, where 17,000 casino staff are threatening to go on strike in protest over pay and 
working conditions. 
Negotiations continued until late last night between the five trades unions representing casino 
workers and the two biggest employers, Casinos de France and Syndicat des casinos modernes de 
France, which includes the Partouche group.  
But the differences between the two sides seemed too great to avoid protests disrupting France's 
188 casinos on New Year's eve, usually one of their busiest days of the year, along with Valentine's 
day and Friday the thirteenth. 
If French roulette wheels grind to a halt tonight it would be a blow for Casinos de France, formed 
by this year's merger of Lucien Barrie`re with the casino arm of Accor. 
The deal created a group with Euros 1bn of sales, 37 casinos and 10 hotels, including Le Fouquet's 
on the Champs Elysees in Paris. 
Unions are calling for customers to boycott casinos and for the government to suspend fiscal 
subsidies. Staff are angry that they have not benefited from the sector's recent growth and are 
demanding a 4 per cent pay rise and more days off for those working night shifts. 
"Staff are not afraid of going on strike because they feel a solidarity on the part of customers," said 
David Rousset, head of the casino branch of the Force Ouvrie`re union. 
Yet executives say night shifts are an integral part of working in the casino sector. They say that 
although revenues rose 2.6 per cent this year to Euros 2.6bn (Dollars 3.4bn), that is slower growth 
than previous years and would be in decline without the opening of new casinos. 
Casino companies also complain about a growing tax burden, already at about 57 per cent, and the 
restrictions of the 35-hour week. 
One of the main sources of tension is the rise of slot machines. Punters playing on slot machines 
pay no tips, meaning croupiers are losing out. 
Slot machines also eat into revenues from traditional games, such as blackjack and baccarat, 
pushing many of them into loss.” 
Event period CAR: 9.32 % 
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11.1.3 Negative corporate governance-category news article 
Example 1. 
Headline: BNP worker embezzled Euros 15m in antiques spree 
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: April 21, 2005 Thursday 
Author: Martin Arnold 
Dateline: Paris 
Company: BNP Baribas SA, Euronext Paris 
Article: 
“BNP Paribas has uncovered an embarrassing alleged Euros 15m (Dollars 19.6m) fraud by one 
of its own accountants, who is said to have used the money to deck her small Paris apartment out 
with some of the most expensive antiques and art on the French market. 
While BNP is hailing the discovery as a success for its internal controls, questions are being 
raised in the French bank about how the low-ranking accountant could have escaped without her 
scam being detected for more than three years. 
Perhaps it was BNP's record profit of Euros 4.7bn last year that convinced the accountant, that 
she could get away with embezzling Euros 15m without France's biggest bank by market 
capitalization noticing. 
It was only after the woman charged with handling the bank's purchasing accounts started 
getting greedy that she was caught in December. 
Most of her biggest purchases came in the second half of last year, and auditors rang the alarm 
bell after finding a Euros 6.8m hole in the 2004 accounts. BNP declined to comment yesterday, 
except to say that no client had been affected. 
The woman is alleged to have used the names of legitimate suppliers of the bank, but switched 
their account details with those of antique dealers. 
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The French press have delighted in listing some of the pieces of 17th and 18th century furniture 
found in the accountant's three-bedroom apartment in a high-rise block in northern Paris. A 
number of France's most prestigious antique dealers are being investigated by police to find out 
why they did not raise questions after delivering furniture worth hundreds of thousands of euros 
to such a small apartment. 
The antiques, including Louis XVI armchairs and silver chandeliers, have been impounded. BNP 
is expected to sell them to recoup some of the lost money. But it is understood there are worries 
that the woman may have massively overpaid for some items.” 
Event period CAR: -3.15% 
Example 2. 
Headline: Swiss watchdog opens probe into insider trading at Adecco 
Source: Financial Times (London, England) 
Date: January 20, 2004 Tuesday 
Author: Haig Simonian 
Dateline: Zurich 
Company: Adecco, Swiss Stock Exchange 
Article: 
“Switzerland's Federal Banking Commission (EBK) yesterday confirmed it had opened an 
investigation into possible insider trading at Adecco, the world's biggest temporary employment 
group. 
The EBK denied it had been stung into action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the US Attorney's Office in New York, which are conducting investigations, and said it had 
previously had no reason to take the initiative. 
The EBK said it had acted after information from the SWX Swiss stock exchange, the self-regulating 
market for which it is ultimately responsible. 
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However, following the decision in 2001 to set up virt-x, the new London-based exchange for 
trading in Swiss blue chips, dealings at the Zurich-based SWX have been restricted to derivatives. 
That means any investigation into alleged anomalies in Adecco shares is, strictly speaking, up to 
the UK's Financial Services Authority. The EBK yesterday said it had, as a matter of course, 
informed the FSA. 
Separately, information emerged yesterday of internal conflicts that could have contributed to the 
procedural failures that emerged at Adecco in the past week. 
The differences centred on frictions between Felix Weber, 53, who resigned last Friday as chief 
financial officer, and Je`rome Caille, its 37-year-old chief executive. 
"Frankly, Felix thought he should have become the boss, and didn't always hide that", said one 
analyst. "There was a certain level of animosity". 
The tension between the two men may have been inevitable given their notably different 
personalities and backgrounds, said analysts who have closely watched the company in recent 
years. 
Mr Weber joined Adecco from McKinsey, the consulting group, six years ago and quickly gained a 
reputation as a formidable strategist, as well as an adroit and energetic communicator. 
Mr Caille, by contrast, had a background almost entirely in operations. A Frenchman, his meteoric 
career at Adecco began at the age of 23, when he ran a branch office in Barcelona. 
Mr Caille's reputation rose after taking over Adecco’s Italian arm in 1997, which he expanded into 
one of the group's most important European operations. 
Even more important, according to some analysts, he was also seen as the driving force behind the 
company's highly successful IT platform. 
Differences between the two reached a head when Mr Weber was passed over for the job of chief 
executive following the appointment of John Bowmer, Adecco’s driving force, as chairman. While 
Mr Caille and Mr Weber appeared collegial on the surface, their differences were widely known. 
The lack of mutual sympathy may have had no obvious bearing on the problems that came to light 
this month. 
Event period CAR: 9.19% 
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11.2 Appendix 2: Companies included in the study 
 
Company Exchange News category Matched firm Matched index 
Ericsson OMX 
Stockholm 
Social Alcatel Lucent S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
COMMS EQ 
Societe Generale de 
Surveillance 
SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Social Umicore SA MSCI EUROPE 
CONS SVS 
BMW Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Fiat Spa MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Sears Roebuck & Co London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Volkswagen AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Michelin Euronext Paris Social Continental AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO 
Marks & Spencer 
Group PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Home Retail Group 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
M/LINE RTL 
Ford Motor CO London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Daimler AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
UPM Kymmene 
Corp 
OMX Helsinki Social Stora Enso Oyj MSCI EUROPE 
PAP/FOR PRD 
Coca-Cola 
Enterprise 
Euronext Paris Social Carlsberg A/S MSCI EUROPE 
BEVERAGES 
KPN Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Social Colt Group S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS 
BAE SYSTEMS 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Eads NV MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO 
Capgemini Euronext Paris Social The Capita Group 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE S/W 
& SVS 
UniCredit Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Agricultural Bank 
Of Greece S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Prudential PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Aviva PLC MSCI EUROPE 
INSURANCE 
Fiat Borsa Italiana Social Volvo AB MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Morgan Crucible CO 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Social SGL Carbon SE MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC EQ 
Transco London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Scottish & 
Southern Energy 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC UTIL 
BP London Stock 
Exchange 
Social ENI MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Swiss Life Group SIX Swiss 
exchange 
Social European Reliance 
Gen. Insurance CO. 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
INSURANCE 
Ryanair Holdings 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Air France-KLM MSCI EUROPE 
AIRLINES  
Unilever PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Orkla ASA MSCI EUROPE FD 
PRD 
Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Air France-KLM MSCI EUROPE 
AIRLINES 
Hsbc Holdings PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Allied Irish Banks 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
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Siemens London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Roche Holding AG MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC EQ 
Ford London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Peugeot SA MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES  
Puma SE Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Adidas AG MSCI EUROPE 
CONS DUR/APP 
KarstadtQuelle AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Burberry Group 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
RETAILING 
Volkswagen AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social BMW MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Groupe Partouche Euronext Paris Social Paddy Power PLC MSCI EUROPE 
HT/REST/LEIS 
Nokia OMX Helsinki Social Ericsson Telephone 
AB 
MSCI EUROPE 
COMMS EQ 
Deutsche Bank AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Bank Of Ireland MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Total S.A. London Stock 
Exchange 
Social MOL Hungarian 
Oil and GAS 
Public Limited 
Company 
MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Nestlé S.A. SIX Swiss 
exchange 
Social Danone MSCI EUROPE FD 
PRD  
Swiss Reinsurance 
Company Ltd 
SIX Swiss 
exchange 
Social Aegon N.V. MSCI EUROPE 
INSURANCE 
HSBC Bank PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Allied Irish Banks 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
The Carlsberg 
Group 
OMX 
Copenhagen 
Social Baltika Breweries MSCI EUROPE 
BEVERAGES  
BHP Billiton London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Xstrata PLC MSCI EUROPE MET 
& MIN 
Deutsche Telekom 
AG 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Social Belgacom S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS 
Eni SpA Borsa Italiana Social Statoil ASA MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC UTIL 
Hyundai Motor CO London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Peugeot SA MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES  
BNP Paribas SA Euronext Paris Social Banco Popolare MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Unilever London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Premier Foods PLC MSCI EUROPE FD 
PRD 
 Allianz SE London Stock 
Exchange 
Social ING Groep NV MSCI EUROPE 
INSURANCE 
Stora Enso Oyj OMX Helsinki Social UPM Kymmene 
Corp 
MSCI EUROPE 
PAP/FOR PRD 
Compagnie 
Financiere Tradition 
SIX Swiss 
exchange 
Social Tullett Prebon PLC MSCI EUROPE 
TRAD COS/DIS 
Dow Chemical CO London Stock 
Exchange 
Social Royal DSM N.V. MSCI EUROPE 
MATERIALS 
Royal Caribbean 
Cruises LTD 
Oslo Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental TUI Travel PLC MSCI EUROPE 
HT/REST/LEIS 
Boliden AB OMX 
Stockholm 
Environmental Essilor 
International S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE MET 
& MIN 
General Electric London Stock Environmental Siemens MSCI EUROPE DIV 
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CO   Exchange FIN SVS 
BP PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Esso Societe 
Anonyme 
Francaise  
MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental ENI MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Corus Group  Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Environmental Allianz SE MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
TotalFinaElf London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Statoil ASA MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Goldfields Ltd. SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Environmental Impala Platinum 
Holdings Limited 
MSCI EUROPE MET 
& MIN 
DLH Group OMX 
Copenhagen 
Environmental Dalhoff Larsen & 
Horneman A/S 
MSCI EUROPE 
PAP/FOR PRD 
Carnival Corp London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Royal Caribbean 
Cruises LTD 
MSCI EUROPE 
HT/REST/LEIS 
Tesco Plc London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Sainsbury (J) PLC MSCI EUROPE 
RETAILING  
BP PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental ERG S.p.A. MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
CRH PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Heidelbergcement 
AG 
MSCI EUROPE 
MATERIALS 
Toyota Motor Corp London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Audi AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Companhia Vale do 
Rio Doce 
Euronext Paris Environmental Xstrata PLC MSCI EUROPE MET 
& MIN  
Chevron 
Corporation 
Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Environmental Repsol YPF SA MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL  
Shell Australia/ 
Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental ENI MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL  
Coca-Cola 
Enterprise 
Euronext Paris Environmental Carlsberg A/S MSCI EUROPE 
BEVERAGES 
Daimler AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Fiat Spa MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Swiss Syngenta AG SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Environmental Yara International 
ASA 
MSCI EUROPE 
CHEMICALS 
Électricité de France 
S.A. 
Euronext Paris Environmental E On AG MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC UTIL 
BP PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental ERG S.p.A. MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL  
Brenntag Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Ashland Inc. MSCI EUROPE :M 
CONS DISCR U  
ArcelorMittal S.A. Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Environmental Acerinox, S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
INDUSTRIALS  
Bayer AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Reckitt Benckiser 
Group PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
PHARM  
BASF SE Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Reckitt Benckiser 
Group PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
CHEMICALS  
Heineken 
International 
Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Environmental Baltika Breweries MSCI EUROPE 
BEVERAGES  
MMC Norilsk Nickel London Stock 
Exchange 
Environmental Antofagasta PLC MSCI EUROPE MET 
& MIN  
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Neste Oil OYJ OMX Helsinki Environmental Galp Energia, Sgps 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
AstraZeneca plc OMX 
Stockholm 
Corporate 
governance 
Sanofi MSCI EUROPE 
PHARM  
Unilever London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Orkla ASA MSCI EUROPE FD 
PRD  
Fuji Heavy 
Industries LTD 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Volkswagen AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Deutsche Bank Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Allied Irish Banks 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS  
Securitas AB OMX 
Stockholm 
Corporate 
governance 
G4S PLC MSCI EUROPE 
CONS SVS 
Credit Suisse First 
Boston 
SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
UBS AG MSCI EUROPE 
TRAD COS/DIS 
Barclays Bank London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Unicredit MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Bayerische Motoren 
Werke Ag (BMW) 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Volkswagen AG MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Pirelli & C Borsa Italiana Corporate 
governance 
Nokian Tyres plc MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO 
Daimler AG Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Volvo AB MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Deutsche Telekom 
AG 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Belgacom S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS  
Vodafone Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Telefonica SA MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS 
Ixos Software Ag Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Plaut AG MSCI EUROPE S/W 
& SVS  
Infineon 
Technologies AG 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Arm Holdings PLC MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC EQ  
Xerox Corp SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Compagnie 
Industrielle Et 
Financiere 
D'ingenierie 
Ingenico S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE CPU 
& PER  
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria 
SA 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Allied Irish Banks 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Hsbc Holdings PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Allied Irish Banks 
PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
UBS AG MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Royal Ahold Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Morrison (WM) 
Supermarkets PLC 
MSCI EUROPE 
RETAILING 
Commerzbank AG London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Absa Group 
Limited 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
AstraZeneca London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Sanofi MSCI EUROPE 
PHARM 
Abbey National 
(Grupo Santander) 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Banco Popular 
Espanol, S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS 
Adecco SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
HAYS PLC MSCI EUROPE 
CONS SVS 
Vodafone Group plc London Stock Corporate Telefonica SA MSCI EUROPE 
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Exchange governance T/CM SVS  
BNP Paribas SA Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Societe Generale 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS  
Dexia SA Euronext 
Brussels 
Corporate 
governance 
Irish Life & 
Permanent Group 
Holdings PL 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS  
Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
OMV AG MSCI EUROPE 
OIL,GAS&C.FUEL 
Vivendi Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Belgacom S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS 
Bank Of Ireland London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Danske Bank A/S MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS  
Samsung Electronics London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Ericsson MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC EQ  
TJ GROUP PLC  OMX Helsinki Corporate 
governance 
Know It AB MSCI EUROPE S/W 
& SVS  
Nokia CORP OMX Helsinki Corporate 
governance 
France Telecom MSCI EUROPE 
COMMS EQ  
UniCredit Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft  
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Societe Generale 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
BANKS  
Capita Group PLC London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Logica PLC MSCI EUROPE S/W 
& SVS  
Hyundai Motor CO London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Peugeot SA MSCI EUROPE 
AUTOMOBILES 
Electricite De France 
S.A. 
Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Enel S.P.A.  MSCI EUROPE 
UTILITIES  
Bae Systems Plc London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Thales S.A. MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO  
Morgan Crucible Co 
Plc 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
ATB Austria 
Antriebstechnik 
Aktiengesellschaft 
MSCI EUROPE 
ELEC EQ 
Deutsche Telekom 
Ag 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
France Telecom 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
T/CM SVS  
Emi Group Ltd  London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Vivendi MSCI EUROPE DIV 
FIN SVS  
Safran Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Dassault Aviation 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO  
Bayer Ag London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Novo Nordisk A/S MSCI EUROPE 
PHARM  
Dsg International Plc London Stock 
Exchange 
Corporate 
governance 
Arcandor AG MSCI EUROPE 
MEDIA  
Groupe Danone Sa Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Parmalat S.p.A. MSCI EUROPE FD 
PRD  
European 
Aeronautic Defence 
& Space Co Eads Nv 
Euronext Paris Corporate 
governance 
Zodiac Aerospace 
S.A. 
MSCI EUROPE 
AUTO COMPO  
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